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Introduction  
Investors are the source of capital that is required to build businesses, increase 
commercial activity and create jobs,1 in an effort to achieve and maintain economic 
prosperity. In return investors require ‘access to the information appropriate to make 
good investment decisions’.2 A number of mechanisms are employed to protect 
investors from amongst others fraudulent activities, insider trading, and the provision 
of false or misleading information about securities and the companies that issue 
them.3  In different jurisdictions, rules protecting investors are derived from different 
sources including company, security, insolvency, competition and case laws, in 
addition to stock exchange regulations and accounting standards. For instance in 
Australia, investor protection is achieved in part through statutory disclosure 
provisions or by Listing Rules of the stock exchange.4    
  In South Africa listed securities are regulated by the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange (‘JSE’). The JSE requires all listed securities to comply with the JSE 
Listings Requirements, which aim to ensure sufficient disclosure of all information 
relevant to investors.5 Another technique the JSE employs to protect investors is the 
investor fund levy: used by the JSE to ‘cover its legislated external regulatory costs 
in respect of amounts paid to the Financial Services Board (‘FSB’) for the market 
abuse investigations it conducts and for the FSB’s regulatory oversight of the 
exchange that is done for the sole benefit of the investors’.6 Equally, the Companies 
Act,7 the Competition Act8 and the voluntary corporate governance code9 are other 
ways in which investors are protected.       
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Commissioner Luis A. Aguilar, ‘Increasing the Vulnerability of Investors’ available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2012/spch082912laa.htm accessed on 10 October 2012. 
2 Ibid. 
3Alec Hogg ‘The first-time investor's guide to the JSE : investment basics’, (2006) Personal Finance 
Newsletter, 13.	  
4	  	  	  Roman Tomasic, Stephen Bottomley, Rob McQueen, Corporations law of Australia 2 ed  (2002)  at 
534. 
5	  Johannesburg Stock Exchange Equities Rules.  
6 JSE equity markets play safe available at 
https://www.saica.co.za/News/MediaKit/Publications/Communiqu%C3%A9issues/Communiqu%C3
%A94NoveNove2010/JSEequitymarketsplaysafe/tabid/2277/language/en-US/Default.aspx accessed 
on 12 November 2012. 
7 Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
8 Competition Act 89 of 1998. 
9 The King III: Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa 2009. 
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The focus of this paper is not on the broad concept of investor protection, but rather 
on the protection of potential investors who are members of the public by statutory 
means. In particular, the paper will consider the protection of investors previously 
provided by the Companies Act 61 of 1973 and now by the Companies Act 71 of 
2008, through the determination of what constitutes an ‘offer to the public for the 
subscription of shares’, in the context of Gold Fields v Harmony Gold.10 The case 
established that a share exchange is included in the definition of a ‘subscription’ and 
it also established that when a group of people who own ‘specific private property’ 
have been selected as the offerees of an offer; they do not constitute a ‘section of the 
public’ in that capacity. Analogous to this overview will be a critical analysis of the 
case in light of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 and the cases referred to in the 
judgement.         
 Furthermore, general consideration shall be given to the statutory changes 
that transpired to company law in South Africa, the United Kingdom and Australia, 
and specifically to the provisions that relate to ‘offers to the public for the 
subscription of shares’. This allows for a comparison of the development of this area 
of law, in view of the fact that both the High Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal 
in Gold Fields v Harmony Gold11 followed case law from the United Kingdom and 
Australia to assist in establishing the meaning of a ‘subscription’ and determining 
what constitutes an ‘offer to the public’? Implicit in this approach is the desire to 
determine whether in future, should there be any significant changes in the relevant 
company law in the United Kingdom and Australia, the South African courts would 
continue to rely on case law from those jurisdictions in finding assistance in 
interpreting the relevant provisions in the South African Companies Act relating to 
‘offers to the public for the subscription of shares’.     
 Finally ss 95 and 96, of the Companies Act 71 of 2008, shall be considered in 
detail in an effort to review the decision of Gold Fields and Harmony Gold12 under 
that Act. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10Gold Fields Ltd v Harmony Gold Mining Co ltd 2005 (2) SA 506 (SCA). 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid.  
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Chapter 1: Companies Act 61 of 1973 and the Common Law  
Overview of Company Law 	  
Company law is the heart of any free market economy. It ‘establishes the parameters 
within which the process of bringing together and organising the factors of 
production can take place’.13 To achieve this goal, company law regulates the 
business, ‘which is the organisational structure in which the production takes place, 
and the capital market, through which funds are raised to finance the production’.14 
Company law, therefore, is the area of law that governs and regulates the dealings of 
companies; it aims to protect the interests of the company, stakeholders and in 
particular potential investors. In the case of ‘offers to the public for the subscription’ 
or purchase of shares, there is a statutory requirement to provide a prospectus.15 This 
involves the disclosure of accurate and adequate information relating to the current 
and future affairs of a company to potential investors, so that they may make well 
informed decisions, based on the merits and demerits of the transaction.16 Therefore, 
in the South African context, where an offer to subscript or purchase the shares of a 
company is made to the public, a prospectus complying with the requirements of       
s 145 of the Companies Act 61 of 197317 should have been issued.  
South African Company Law overview	  
Company law is an essential tool for the economic development of any market, and it 
is through regulation of business enterprises that it provides the platform for a 
competitive economy. Prior to 1 May 2011, companies in South Africa were 
regulated by the Companies Act 61 of 1973 (‘1973 Act’). The Act applied to every 
company incorporated under the 1973 Act, including external companies with a 
place of business in the Republic.18       
 Of particular importance was Chapter VI of the 1973 Act that regulated the 
raising of capital by a company through the offer of its shares to the public.19 It 
controlled offers to the public for subscription and sale of shares, however it was not 
every offer to the public for the subscription for, or sale of, shares which qualified as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 John Lowry & Arad Reisberg Pettet’s Company Law: Company Law and Corporate Finance 4 ed. 
(2012) 3. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Companies Act 61 of 1973 s145. 
16 HS Cilliers, ML Benade, & JJ Henning et al Cilliers & Benade Corporate Law  3ed (2000) 256. 
17 Piet Delport  ‘Offer to the 'Public': Even More Disharmony’ (2005) 17 SA Merc L J 388. 
18	  Companies Act 61 of 1973 s2(2) read with the definition of ‘external company’ in s1(1).	  
19	  Ibid ss 142-169. 	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an offer to the public for the purposes of chapter VI.20 This is because the chapter 
provided guidelines which assisted in determining whether the offer was one to the 
‘public’. It aimed to protect investors by prohibiting offers to the public unless they 
were accompanied by a prospectus,21 providing information regarding disclosure 
requirements.22 In order to activate the protection three elements had to be 
established; namely that there had to be an offer; that was in respect of shares; and 
made to the public.23        
 Section 142 provided the definitions specifically applicable to this chapter. In 
establishing what was an ‘offer to the public’ for the purposes of the chapter, the 
meaning of the term was read together with s 144, which detailed offers that were not 
made to the public.24 It therefore follows that if an offer did not constitute an offer to 
the public as defined in s142, then it had to be scrutinised in light of the exclusions 
found in s 144. In keeping with the objective of protecting investors s 145 of the 
1973 Act, provided that there could be no offer for subscription to the public without 
a duly registered prospectus. A prospectus could only be registered if it had fulfilled 
all the requirements of the chapter in relation to the prospectus.25 The legislature did 
this in order to ensure that the prospective investor received information that was 
both true and accurate.26 Contravention of this provision resulted in the possibility of 
a fine, imprisonment, or both.27 
An offer to the public 
What constitutes an ‘offer to the public’?  This has been hailed as one of the most 
troublesome questions in this area of company law.28 Simply stated, when an offer 
constitutes an ‘offer to the public’, it falls within the ambit of the legislative 
provisions of the 1973 Act, and is subject to its restrictions and requirements, notably 
that of a prospectus.29        
 ‘An offer in relation to shares means an offer made in any way, including by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  Philip  M Meskin Henochsberg on the Companies Act  4ed (1985) 209 -210.	  
21	  Companies Act 61 of 1973 s143(1).	  
22	  Philip M Meskin op cit note 20 at 210.	  
23	  HS Cilliers, ML Benade, & JJ Henning op cit note 16 at 257.	  
24	  MS Blackman et al Commentary on the Companies Act vol 1 (2002) at 6-3 (Revision service 3, 
2006).	  
25	  Pretorius et al (eds) Hahlo’s South African Company Law through the cases 5 ed (1991) 134. 
26	  MS Blackman op cit note 24 at 6-16  (Revision service 3, 2006).	  
27	  Companies Act 61 of 1973 s145(2) & s441(1)(d). 
28 Jacqueline Yeats ‘Public offerings of company securities: a closer look at certain aspects of chapter 
4 of the Companies Act	  71 of 2008’	  2010 Acta Juridica 117 at 119. 
29 Companies Act 61 of 1973 s145. 
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provisional allotment or allocation, for the subscription for or sale of any shares, and 
includes an invitation to subscribe for or purchase any shares’.30 Note that, an offer 
to the public refers to ‘any offer to the public and includes an offer of shares to any 
section of the public, whether selected as members or debenture-holders of the 
company concerned or as clients of the person issuing the prospectus or in any other 
manner’.31 This however, does not imply that all offers are offers to the public; 
legislation has also delineated those offers which are not considered offers to the 
public.32         
 The 1973 Act, did not define the word ‘public’ in relation to an offer of 
shares, it was therefore determined by inference to the definition of ‘offer to the 
public’.33 The word has also been held to bear its ordinary or popular meaning.34 
This approach resulted in “a ‘section of the public’, ‘whether selected as members or 
debenture holders of the company concerned or as clients of the person issuing the 
prospectus concerned or in any other manner’35 to be included in the meaning of the 
word ‘public”.36 Categorically speaking the meaning of ‘public’ was neither fixed 
nor universal;37 as such each case was to be determined on a case by case basis,38 
taking into account the unique circumstances of each case.    
 In the Australian case of Corporate Affairs Commission (SA) v Australian 
Central Credit Union39  it was held to be appropriate to consider whether the relevant 
group of persons, to whom an offer has been made ‘is one which parliament could 
reasonably be expected to have had in mind as part of the investing public to be 
protected by the disclosure requirements’.40 It follows therefore, that the test to 
determine whether an offer is one made to the public, must have regard to the 
individuals who can accept the offer, rather than the identity of the recipients of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Ibid s142 (1). 
31 Ibid. 
32 Companies Act 61 of 1973 s144. 
33 HS Cilliers, ML Benade, & JJ Henning op cit note 16 at 259. 
34 S v National Board of Executors 1971 3 SA 817 (D) 824; Hurst v Vestcorp Ltd Ltd (1987) 13 ACLR 
17 CA (NSW) 42. 
35	  Companies Act 61 of 1973 s142(1).	  
36	  HS Cilliers, ML Benade, & JJ Henning op cit note 16 at 259.	  
37 Lee v Evans (1964) 112 CLR 276 (HC of A) 283. 
38 Lee v Evans supra 285–286; Securities and Exchange Commission v Sunbeam Gold Mines Co 9 Cir 
1938, 95 F 2d 699, 701, where it was said that to determine the distinction ‘between ‘public’ and 
‘private’ in any particular context under which the distinction is sought to be made it is essential to 
examine the circumstances and to consider the purposes sought to be achieved by such distinction’. 
39	  [1985] HCA 64 (1985) 157 CLR 201.	  
40 Corporate Affairs Commission (SA) v Australian Central Credit Union  supra 211. 
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offer.41 Simply put it means that, should an offer be made to all property owners in 
South Africa and Mr X, a property owner in Cape Town receives the offer, the test 
should not be focused on Mr X who has received the offer but rather on the fact that 
anyone who owns property in South Africa can accept the offer. Mr X can therefore; 
pass the offer on to his cousin who resides in Pretoria, thereby implying that the offer 
is open to anyone who has the means of accepting the offer.    
 An ‘offer to the public’ had to be a general invitation made to the public; that 
is, ‘an invitation to all and sundry of some segment of the community at large, in 
other words, within that sufficient area of the community the invitation must be 
general in the sense that it is capable of being acted upon by any member of the 
public’.42 Implied by the foregoing statement is the absence of a distinguishing 
characteristic shared only by the segment of the community, however should the 
distinguishing characteristic be present; it is there to be used by the offeror only as a 
means of limiting the extent of the offer.43  Consequently, a selection criterion may 
be used for selection and not as a prerequisite for acceptance of the offer, resulting in 
an ‘offer to the public’;44 this also speaks to the generality of the offer. Consequently, 
the indifference of the offeror to the identity of the offeree who accepts the offer, 
essentially gives the offer its ‘public’ character as it is a general offer.45  
 To determine that an offer is made to the ‘public’, one must make a factual 
enquiry as to the true nature of the offer, and not on the manner of communication 
used to make the offer.46 This is achieved by considering whether, by inference, the 
offer is capable of acceptance by any member of the public;47  that the terms of the 
offer are ones made to the public, and the number of offerees that the offer has been 
made to infer the notion of ‘public’.48 To get a comprehensive understanding of what 
constitutes an ‘offer to the public’, it is not sufficient to look at each factor 
individually; the matter should be approached in a holistic manner. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Governments Stock & Other Securities Investment Co Ltd v Christopher 1956 1 All ER 490 493; 
Lee v Evans supra note 37; Corporate Affairs Commission (SA) v Australian Central Credit Union 
207 supra note 39 at 62; MS Blackman  op cit note 24 at 6-4. 
42 Lee v Evans supra 285–286. 
43	  LexisNexis (South Africa)  Meaning of  ‘offer to public’ available at 
http://butterworths.uct.ac.za.ezproxy.uct.ac.za/nxt/gateway.dll/dc/l6ba/g9ba/qaca/6z6f/7z6f/a06f/f06f?
f=templates$fn=default.htm$vid=mylnb:10.1048/enu accessed 15 October 2012.	  
44	  Hurst v Vestcorp Ltd (1987) 13 ACLR 17 CA (NSW) 43.	  
45 Lexis Nexis  Meaning of ‘offer to public’ op cit note 43. 
46 Australian Softwood Forests  Pty Ltd v Attorney-General (NSW)  (1981) 148 CLR 121 (HC of A) 
143; O’Brien v Melbank Corp Ltd  (1991) 7 ACSR 19 (VIC) 29 30 37. 
47 O’Brien v Melbank supra  29 30 63 64. 
48 Hurst v Vestcorp Ltd  supra note 44 at 25-6 ; O’Brien v Melbank supra 30 37. 
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Section of the public 	  
The statutory definition of ‘offers to the public’, in the 1973 statute included an offer 
to any ‘section of the public’.49 This extended the ordinary meaning of the term, and 
as such, it had been held that the inclusion of ‘a section of the public’ spread the 
ordinary meaning of the ‘public’ beyond its legislated boundaries and ‘eliminated the 
dichotomy between an invitation to the public at large, and an invitation to a select 
group to whom and to whom alone the invitation is addressed’.50 By virtue of the 
extension of the term ‘public’ it allowed for the inclusion of ‘matters which 
otherwise would not be encompassed by it and to avoid possible uncertainty by 
expressly providing for the inclusion of particular borderline cases’.51 Thereby, 
allowing the section to be proactive rather than reactive, in protecting investors. 
 To determine whether a group to whom an offer had been made was a 
‘section of the public’ reference was made to the specific circumstance of the case at 
hand and could not be determined in the abstract.52  It has been suggested that in 
order to differentiate a group from a ‘section of a public’ the standpoint of the offeror 
had to be taken into account, which led to the pertinent question, of whether a 
‘reasonable person’ in the offeror’s shoes considering to make an offer to the group 
would see it as a ‘section of the public.’53 To appropriately respond to the question, 
the reasonable person had to take into account the relationship between the offeror 
and the group, the rational connection between the offer made and the common 
characteristics of the members of the group, and also had to ensure that the 
relationship existed prior to the offer being made.54  If the relationship was 
established only after the offer was made then this would strongly indicate that the 
group is a ‘section of the public’. One therefore should be cognisant of the fact that 
none of the aforementioned individual factors alone was conclusive proof that the 
offer was one made to a ‘section of the public’.55 Furthermore, another criterion that 
could have been used to distinguish a public offer from a private offer was by reason 
of the offerees’ previous relationship with the offeror, that they had a ‘substantially 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Companies Act 61 of 1973 142. 
50	  Corporate Affairs Commission (SA) v Australian Central Credit Union supra note 39 at 206–207.	  
51	  Ibid at 206–207; 61–62.	  
52 Ibid 201 208 212. 
53 Ibid at  201 212-13.  
54 MS Blackman  op cit note 24  at 6-7; Corporate Affairs Commission (SA) v Australian Central 
Credit Union supra note 39 at 208. 
55	  O’Brien v Melbank supra note 46 at 38-39.	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different or greater interest in the offer’ than other offerees’ who did not share the 
special relationship with the offeror, would have had in the offer.56   
 In the event where an offer was made by a random person and there was the 
absence of a rational connection between the common characteristic which alienates 
the members of the group from other members in the community, and the nature of 
the offer made to them, the group prima facie would constitute a ‘section of the 
public’ for the purposes of the offer.57 If, however, under the circumstances there 
was the presence of  “some subsisting special  relationship between the offeror and 
the  members of a group or some rational connection between the common 
characteristic of members of a group and the offer, the question whether the group 
constituted a ‘section of the public’ for the purposes of the offer” would be 
determined by taking onto account a variety of factors of which the most significant 
would be: the number of persons comprising the group; the antecedent relationship 
between the offeror and the members of the group; the nature and content of the 
offer; and  the significance of any particular characteristic which would identify the 
members of the group and any connection between that characteristic and the offer.58 
 In the process of determining whether, a particular group was a ‘section of 
the public’, one had to take a close examination of the common characteristic shared 
by the group. Should the shared characteristic be well-defined and restrictive this was 
considered suggestive of the group to be a private group.59 When a group was said to 
be well-defined and restrictive it meant that there were limitations and restrictions on 
who could be a member, and on the number of people that could be in the group.60 
 Consequently, to be an offer to a ‘section of the public’, that section had to be 
of the ‘public’,61 in other words, no offer was an offer to the public unless it was 
‘public’ in character.62 Furthermore, where that characteristic was absent, the offer 
did not fall within the statutory definition and reliance upon the provisions of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 MS Blackman ‘Companies’ LAWSA Part 1 Vol 4 para 147 citing the Corporate Affairs Commission 
case as authority. 
57	  Corporate Affairs Commission (SA) v Australian Central Credit Union supra note 39 at 8. 
58 Ibid see also Lee v. Evans supra note 37 at 287; Australian Softwood Forests Pty. Ltd. v. Attorney-
General (N.S.W.) 121. 
59 Corporate Affairs Commission (SA) v Australian Credit Union.supra note 39 at 10. 
60	  Ibid.	  
61 Ibid at–208 212; 62 65; Hurst v Vestcorp Ltd supra note 44 at 31. 
62 Lee v Evans supra note 37 at 285–286; Corporate Affairs Commission (SA) v Australian Central 
Credit Union supra note 39 at 207–208 212. 
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1973 Act was made redundant, as it would be in substance a private offer as opposed 
to a public offer.    
Subscription  
A final issue for consideration is the meaning of the term ‘subscription’ found in       
s 145. Notably unlike the meaning of an ‘offer to the public’ the 1973 Act did not 
define an offer for ‘subscription’.63 Therefore, the use of foreign and local case law 
was key in determining the meaning of the term.       
 Of fundamental importance is the British case of Governments Stock & Other 
Securities Investment Co Ltd v Christopher64 (‘Christopher’). In that case, a British 
Commonwealth Shipping Co Ltd (‘New Company’) offered to acquire all the 
preference and ordinary shares and stock in the issued capitals of Union-Castle Mail 
Steamship Co Ltd (‘Union’) and the Clan Line Steamers Ltd (‘Clan’), in exchange 
for shares in the New Company. Union and Clan, the plaintiffs, brought a motion 
before the court, contending that the circular provided by the New Company, which 
contained the offer was in fact a prospectus to which s 38 of the British Companies 
Act, 1948, applied.  Wynn-Parry J held that the offer was not an offer for 
‘subscription’; therefore, it did not have to comply with the requirements of the Act 
to provide a prospectus. He held that the word, 
“subscription” means “taking or agreeing to take shares for cash” and 
that it “imports that the person agreeing to take the shares puts himself 
under a liability to pay the normal amount thereof in cash”…In 
Murray’s Oxford Dictionary, one of the meanings attributed to 
‘subscription’ is a promise over one’s signature to pay a sum of 
money for shares in an undertaking. I can find no secondary meaning 
attributed to “subscription” in the Companies Act, 1948. On the 
contrary, paras 4, 5 6 and 7 of Part 1 of Sch 4 to the Act clearly 
require that “subscription” and “subscribe” involve the notion of 
payment in cash. The circular in this case does not invite subscription 
for shares for cash. For these reasons I am of the opinion that the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 MS Blackman op cit note 24  at 6-17. 
64 1956 1 All ER 490 492. 
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circular is not a prospectus within the meaning of that word as used in 
the Companies Act, 1948.65 
Accordingly, ‘subscription’ denotes a payment in cash.    
 Conversely, the decision in the Australian case of Broken Hill Proprietary Co 
Ltd v Bell Resources Ltd66 (‘Broken Hill’) decided not to follow the approach 
proffered in Christopher. Instead, the court held that it could ‘see no basis in law or 
principle, having regard to the legislative scheme contained in the Companies Code, 
for limiting the definition of subscription’.67 The court was advocating for a broader 
meaning of the word, so that a larger range of investors could possibly be protected 
by legislation.  
Chapter 2: Gold Fields v Harmony Decision 	  
Introduction 	  
There are a number of ways in which companies may ‘effect business combinations’; 
one such way is through a takeover.68  A takeover refers to the activity of acquiring 
another company’s (‘target company’) securities, in order to give the acquiring 
company control over the target company.69 This is synonymous to acquiring the 
assets of the target company, by obtaining control through management of the 
company by virtue of owning the controlling share of said company.70 The target 
company will subsequently survive the change in ownership.71 Takeover transactions 
which result in a change of ownership of a regulated company are ‘carefully 
monitored and regulated to ensure that the holders of securities in a company are 
treated equality and fairly and have equal access to the same information’.72 In line 
with the goal of investor protection, the 1973 Act in s 145(1) stated: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65	  Governments Stock & Other Securities Investment Co Ltd v Christopher supra note 64 492-493.	  
66 (1984) 8 ACLR 609 617 (SC Vic). 
67	  Broken Hill Proprietary Co Ltd v Bell Resources Ltd  supra note 66 at 617.	  
68	  Maleka Femida Cassim and Jacqueline Yeats ‘Fundamental Transactions, takeovers and offers’ in 
Farouk HI Cassim et al (eds) Contemporary Company Law 2 ed (2012) 675.	  
69	  HS Cilliers, ML Benade, & JJ Henning op cit note 16 at 459. 	  
70	  Ibid at 460.	  
71 Ibid. 
72	  Maleka Femida Cassim and Jacqueline Yeats ‘Fundamental Transactions, takeovers and offers’ op 
cit note 68 at 731.	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No person shall make any offer to the public for the subscription for 
shares unless it is accompanied by a prospectus complying with the 
requirements of this Act and registered in the Companies Registration 
Office, and no person shall issue such a prospectus which has not been 
so registered. 
The section established the requirements that a company wishing to offer its 
securities for ‘subscription’ to the public had to comply with.73 Therefore the 
document commonly known as the prospectus connotes investor protection.  As 
suggested before, the mandatory requirement for the provision of a prospectus 
creates a duty of full disclosure, which in turn will ensure that the investor has 
accurate and appropriate information to make a well informed evaluation of the 
proposed investment.         
 A prospectus was defined as a ‘prospectus, notice, circular, advertisement or 
other invitation… offering any shares of a company to the public’.74 However, it has 
been pointed out that the prospectus is not the offer but a document that accompanies 
the offer.75 
The most recent case to have dealt with the issue of investor protection,76 in 
respect of ‘offers to the public for the subscription of shares’ under the 1973 Act was 
the case of Gold Fields Limited and another v Harmony Gold Mining Limited and 
others.77 The decision in the case became the leading authority on the type of offer 
that would constitute an ‘offer to the public for the subscription of shares’ until the 
enactment of the Companies Act 71 of 2008, which will be discussed in more detail 
below.      
Gold Fields Limited v Harmony Gold Mining Limited 
The Facts	  
In 2004 Harmony Gold Mining Company Limited (‘Harmony’) made the decision to 
acquire shares in Gold Fields Limited (‘Gold Fields’), resulting in the fusion of Gold 
Fields into Harmony. This in turn would make Gold Fields a subsidiary of Harmony, 
as Harmony would have acquired the controlling shareholding of Gold Fields. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73	  MS Blackman op cit note 24 at 6-15  (Revision service 3, 2006).	  
74	  Companies Act 61 of 1973 s1(1).	  
75	  HS Cilliers, ML Benade, & JJ Henning op cit note 16 at 269. 
76	  Which refers to the structures in place to safe guard the interests and rights of individuals.	  
77	  [2005] JOL 13691 (W)	  ;[2005] 3 All SA 114 (SCA).	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Notably, both companies were listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, London 
Stock Exchange, Euronext Paris, and were also quoted in the form of depository 
receipts on Euronext Brussels and the New York Stock.     
 Gold Fields had one billion authorised ordinary shares of which 491 806 265 
shares had been issued. Harmony wished to acquire these shares, and on 16 October 
2004, they accordingly, approached the directors of Gold Fields with the proposal for 
a merger of the two companies. The Gold Fields board requested more information, 
however, Harmony did not comply with the request and instead they publicly 
announced their offer.  The particulars of the offer were such that Harmony was to 
acquire from the shareholders of Gold Fields one Gold Fields share in return for 
1.275 Harmony shares which were to be issued by Harmony. The offer was made in 
two parts. The first part would see Harmony acquire a maximum of 34.9 per cent of 
the shares by no later than 26 November 2004. The second part of the offer was for 
the balance of the shares of Gold Fields, which was dependent upon various 
conditions being fulfilled.         
 Gold Fields subsequently, made an application to the Witwatersrand Local 
Division of the High Court, that the Harmony offer was incapable of implementation, 
on the premise that the offer was unlawful and of no force or effect, because the offer 
was not accompanied by a registered prospectus in terms of s 145 of the 1973 Act.78 
The High Court held that it was a matter of proper interpretation of s 145 of the 1973 
Act.79 Accordingly, the High court was faced with two fundamental issues: 
i. whether the taking up of shares in exchange for other shares fell within the 
meaning of the term ‘subscription’ as defined in s 145 of the Companies Act 
61 of 1973, or whether this term is confined to the taking up of shares for 
cash only; and  
ii. whether an offer by company A made to the shareholders of company B to 
acquire their shares in company B in exchange for shares in company A (in 
order to achieve a merger) would constitute an ‘offer to the public’ as 
defined in s 142 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78	  Gold Fields Limited v Harmony Gold Mining Limited of [2005] JOL 13691 (W) para 3. 
79 Ibid.	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Goldblatt J held that the term ‘subscription refers to the taking or agreeing to take 
shares for cash’ and relied on Christopher.80 As to the second issue Goldblatt J, 
found the offer not to constitute an ‘offer to the public’ as the group was not targeted 
as a ‘section of the public’, but rather as a ‘specific and peculiar group of persons 
who owned specific assets’.81 
Gold Fields then made an appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal, where the 
appeal application was dismissed. However unlike the High Court the Supreme 
Court of Appeal relied on the case of Broken Hill Proprietary Co Ltd v Bell 
Resources Ltd 82 to determine that the term ‘subscription’ was an undertaking to take 
up shares, not only for cash.83       
 The decision in Gold Fields  v Harmony Gold Mining, had far reaching 
consequences on the ‘offer to the public for the subscription of shares’ as such it 
shall be considered in detail, and critically analysed in the following section. 
Critical analysis of Gold Fields Limited v Harmony Gold Mining Limited	  
With respect to the definition of ‘subscription’, there are two schools of thought on 
the matter.84 There is the accepted English common law position that states a 
‘subscription’  ‘refers to the taking up of shares for cash which does not include the 
taking up of shares in exchange for other shares’.85 Conversely, the Australia school 
of thought held the term ‘subscription’ to include a share exchange in addition to the 
taking of shares for cash.86 In Gold Fields v Harmony Gold Mining (‘Gold Fields’), 
the High Court followed the English approach, whereas, the Supreme Court of 
Appeal followed the Australian approach.      
 With respect to the issue of what constituted an ‘offer to the public’ as 
defined in s 142 of the 1973 Act, both the High Court and Supreme Court of Appeal 
considered the decisions in Australian Control Credit Union v Corporate Affairs 
Commission87 (‘Corporate Affairs Commission’) and TNT Australia (Pty) Ltd v 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80	  Ibid at para 10.	  
81	  Gold Fields Limited v Harmony supra note 78 para 12.	  
82	  (1984) 8 ACLR 609.	  
83	  Broken Hill Proprietary Co Ltd v Bell Resources Ltd at10.	  
84	  Maleka Femida Cassim ‘Gold  Fields v Harmony. A Lost Opportunity To Clarify Section 145 of the 
Companies Act’  122 S. African L.J. 269 2005 at 269. 
85 Ibid; Governments Stock and Other Securities Investment Co Ltd v Christopher supra note 64. 
86 Broken Hill Proprietary Co Ltd v Bell Resources supra note 82 at 609. 
87 Supra note 39 at 718. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
14	  
	  
	  
	  
Normandy Resources88 and held that the Harmony Gold offer was not an offer to the 
public, and accordingly did not require a prospectus. 
Subscription  
Use of the dictionary by the court  
Subscription generally refers to ‘an acquisition of unissued shares directly from the 
company, by way of an application to the company, which then allots and issues the 
shares to the subscriber’.89 When Goldblatt J sitting in the High Court looked at the 
term ‘subscription’, he acknowledged that the term was not defined in the 1973 Act, 
however, in an effort to define the term he considered the judicial opinion of Wynn-
Parry J in Governments Stock and other Securities Investment Co Ltd v Christopher90 
(‘Christopher’). In that case his lordship held that in the context of a ‘subscription’ 
for shares, the ordinary meaning of the word is the ‘taking or agreeing to take shares 
for cash’.91  His lordship, based his reasoning on three factors, the meaning of the 
term as derived from the Murray’s Oxford Dictionary which was  ‘a promise over 
one’s signature to pay a sum of money for shares in an undertaking’; reliance on 
previous decisions, for which he did not provide any justification as to why the 
decisions supported  his decision; and lastly an unsupported statement referring to 
paragraph 4-7 of  Part 1 of Schedule 4 of the Companies Act 1948, claiming a similar 
meaning of the term; that is ‘subscribe’ involves the notion of payment in cash.92 Of 
particular importance, is the reliance by the High Court in Gold Fields on paragraph 
21 of Schedule 3 of the 1973 Act, which was the equivalent of paragraph 4 of 
Schedule 4 of the English Companies Act, 1948 as justification to follow the 
decision laid down in Christopher,93 this shall be considered in detail below in 
reference to s165 of the 1973 Act. However, the High Court’s reliance on 
Christopher can be criticised as the court is following unsubstantiated ratio decidendi 
by his lordship, there might very well have been other factors he considered that 
might be peculiar to that case or English law at the time that would have no bearing 
on the circumstances in Gold Fields.       
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 TNT Australia (Pty) Ltd v Normandy Resources NL (1989) 15 ACER 99. 
89 Governments Stocks & Other Securities Investment Co Ltd v Christopher supra note 64; Maleka 
Femida Cassim op cit note 84 at 273. 
90 Supra note 64 at 492-493. 
91	  Governments Stocks & Other Securities Investment Co Ltd v Christopher supra  note 64 at 492-493.	  
92 Maleka Femida Cassim op cit note 84 at 270. 
93 Ibid. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
15	  
	  
	  
	  
The Supreme Court of Appeal took a contrary position to that of the High Court. The 
court found the definition of the term ‘subscription’ expounded in the English case of 
Christopher to be restrictive and incorrect.94 Instead, the Supreme Court of Appeal 
relied on the meaning of the term ascribed to it by the Shorter Oxford English 
Dictionary which is ‘to promise over one’s signature to pay (a sum of money) for 
shares in an undertaking’.95 It further held that the ‘words in parenthesis indicated 
that, that part of the definition of ‘subscribe’ is not universally applicable’, and that 
the dictionary meaning ‘does not require the consideration to be in cash (although 
that is usual)’.96 This meaning was relied upon by the Supreme Court of Appeal in 
support of its decision that a share exchange is considered a ‘subscription’. It is 
important to note that the dictionary meaning of the term ‘subscribe’ cannot be relied 
upon exclusively to determine its true meaning, because it is not ‘universally 
applicable’,97 there are numerous dictionaries with different meanings of the same 
word, with none of the dictionaries providing authority on which the meaning of the 
word is based. How then does one decide which dictionary to use? Consequently, the 
court can be biased to a particular dictionary; the court may end up choosing a 
dictionary that best supports its views, therefore any legal analysis must take into 
account the inherent limitations of the dictionary used.98 Accordingly, it has been 
suggested that, 
judges should use dictionaries with the understanding that words 
‘never stand by themselves,’ but rather ‘derive their meaning from 
context and their background in the relevant culture.’ Without context, 
a word is meaningless. And without considering context, so too is the 
use of a dictionary to define a single statutory term.99  
It is respectfully submitted that both the High Court and he Supreme Court of Appeal 
in Gold Fields should have considered more than one dictionary, and in particular 
should have consulted a South African dictionary in determining the meaning of the 
term ‘subscribe’, as it would be unique to the South African context. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94	  Gold Fields Limited v Harmony Gold Mining Limited supra 77 at para 9.	  
95	  Ibid para 8.	  
96 Ibid para 8-9. 
97 Maleka Femida Cassim op cit note 84 at 270. 
98	  Philip P A. Rubin ‘War of the Words: How Courts Can Use Dictionaries in Accordance With 
Textualist   Principles’ Duke Law Journal Vol. 60 (2010) at 190.	  
99Ibid 189. 
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The use of case law by the court 
The Supreme Court of Appeal disagreed with the English law approach and instead 
followed the Australian law approach as expounded by Hampel J in Broken Hill,100 
namely that the decisions cited in Christopher ‘does not support the construction that 
was placed on the meaning of ‘subscription’, as meaning the taking of, or agreement 
to take, shares for cash, but rather that a ‘subscription’ would encompass an offer to 
take up shares in exchange for other shares’. MF Cassim has cogently, pointed out, 
that the Supreme Court of Appeal in Gold Fields and the court in Broken Hill, were 
remiss in not providing the rationale behind their reason in dismissing the decision in 
Christopher.101         
 Clearly this has an impact on the doctrine of precedent.102 It is respectfully 
submitted that the failure by the Supreme Court of Appeal in providing the 
justification for following Broken Hill did not provide basic guidelines for 
interpreting the law for other courts dealing with analogous situations. Lower courts 
have no way of determining how the Supreme Court of Appeal reached its decision 
or why the court followed the Australian approach in Broken Hill.   
 Consequently, MF Cassim, agrees with the decision by Hampel J in Broken 
Hill and Nugent JA in Gold Fields, in that  the application of the authorities cited in 
Christopher to the facts is questionable.103 Although the cited authorities may 
possibly provide support for the decision in Christopher, it is doubtful that the 
‘decision necessarily follows from the judgments referred’.104 Accordingly, she 
convincingly, points out that ‘some justification and reasons on why these decisions 
could correctly be extended to the facts of Christopher is sorely lacking’.105  In 
Christopher the court cited Chicago Railway Terminal Elevator Co v Inland Revenue 
Comrs 106 (‘Chicago Railway’) and Brown v Inland Revenue Comrs, 107  (‘Brown’) 
these two decisions provide credence to the  suggestion that an ‘exchange is not the 
equivalent of a ‘subscription’, albeit, both decisions were decided in the context of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 Supra note 82. 
101	  Maleka Femida Cassim op cit note 84 at 271.	  
102	  which requires courts to follow the binding decisions of coordinate and higher courts. 
103	  Maleka Femida Cassim op cit note 84 at 271.	  
104 Governments Stock and other Securities Investment Co Ltd v Christopher supra  note 64 at 492. 
105 Maleka Femida Cassim op cit note 84 at 271. 
106 (1896) (75 LT 157). 
107 (1900) (84 LT 71). 
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the British Stamp Act, in relation to debentures and bonds, which leads to the logical 
assumption that the same meaning may not be attributable to the meaning of 
‘subscription’ as determined in the Companies Act, especially with regards to shares 
and not debentures and bonds’.108 In support of this assertion, the court in Chicago 
Railway109 stated that the law with respect to the issue of shares in a company bore 
little analogy to the transfer or the exchange of bonds. However this might not have 
been the case under the 1973 Act  with respect to the relevant provision as it refers to 
the ‘subscription’ of ‘shares’ and not ‘debentures and bonds’.110 As such it would 
have been judicious for the court in Christopher to have provided insight as to why; 
the court saw it fit to extend the law ‘relating to bonds and marketable securities as 
defined in the Stamps Act, to shares.’111       
 In Arnison v Smith, 112  (‘Arnison’) which dealt with the misrepresentation of 
fact in the prospectus, both the lower court and the appeal court determined that the 
meaning of a ‘subscription’ of shares did not apply to the allotment of fully paid-up 
shares as part payment for a construction contract. Kekewich J remarked that to 
‘subscribe’ meant ‘an agreement to take shares by means of a formal application, or 
otherwise; but, at any rate, an agreement under which there would be a liability to 
pay’.113 The use of Arnison in Christopher as authority was an appropriate choice,114 
although, Christopher, ought to have distinguished some pertinent facts in Arnison, 
specifically that the decision did not exclusively rely on the ordinary meaning of the 
term ‘subscription’, but that the court took into account the context in which it was 
used in the prospectus as well as the surrounding circumstances of the case.115 For 
instance, in Arnison, the shares were used as payment for the services provided by 
the construction company whereas the shares in Christopher were used as 
consideration to acquire other shares. What is more, a monetary value can easily be 
placed on services rendered, but, the same does not necessarily apply to an exchange 
of shares,116 as it is a complex and difficult procedure to value shares.   
 Notably, when a previous case is distinguished, it follows that the doctrine of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108 Maleka Femida Cassim op cit note 84 at 271. 
109 Supra note 106 at 160.   
110	  Companies Act 61 of 1973 s145.	  
111	  Maleka Femida Cassim op cit note 84 at 271.	  
112 (1889) (41 ChD 348).	  
113	  Ibid 358. 
114 Maleka Femida Cassim op cit 84 at 271. 
115 Ibid at 272. 
116 Ibid. 
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precedence does not operate so as to require the former case to be followed or 
applied in the present case, accordingly, it is respectfully submitted that the court in 
Gold Fields should have distinguished the authorities cited, which would have made 
them persuasive rather than decisive. This may have resulted in a different outcome, 
as the court would not have followed the authorities without having regard to the 
particular South African context and surrounding circumstances of the case. 
 It has cogently been submitted that regardless of the fact that the court in 
Christopher, failed to provide the rationale behind its decision to follow the stated 
authorities aforementioned, this, however, was not deemed sufficient reason for the 
court in Broken Hill and the Supreme Court of Appeal in Gold Fields to dismiss the 
case.117 Noteworthy, is the fact that the decision in Broken Hill to summarily dismiss 
the decision in Christopher and concluding that ‘subscription’ includes a share 
exchange transaction, were evidently not supported by any authority, whether by 
statute or common law.118 In support of this conclusion the court stated that there was 
‘no basis in law or principle ... for limiting the definition in the way his Lordship 
did’.119 Furthermore, Hampel J, stated in support of his decision that a share 
exchange constituted a ‘subscription’, that 
there is no reason, in my view, why the provisions of the Code should 
be interpreted so as to deprive people who subscribe in shares in 
consideration for other shares of the protection of s 96. It is arguable 
that even greater protection is necessary in those circumstances.120 
This is because he felt that the aim of the Companies Code in the broadest sense was 
to protect the public from the commercial activities of companies, for instance 
through the provision of information relevant to the aforementioned activities.121 As 
commendable as his decision was, he failed to provide authority in support of his 
decision.        
 Consequently, Broken Hill decided that the meaning of the term 
‘subscription’ should have a wider meaning than that expounded in the Christopher 
decision, without any explanation as to why this is the case. As previously mentioned 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 Ibid. 
118 Ibid; Broken Hill Proprietary Co Ltd v Bell Resources Ltd supra note 82 at 617. 
119 Ibid. 
120 Ibid. 
121 Ibid 613. 
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decisions from superior courts are influential in assisting lower courts and courts of 
other jurisdictions to interpret the law and guide judgments in circumstances that 
while not exactly the same, are similar to the original case. Respectfully it is 
submitted that the approach followed by Broken Hill is not helpful as another court, 
for instance, the Supreme Court of Appeal in Gold Fields, which relied on this 
decision, would not have the full facts behind the ratio decidendi, which would be 
useful in assisting the court in making a well-informed judgement, resulting in an 
unsound judgement, that has dire consequences. In support of this conclusion MF 
Cassim,122 persuasively suggested that, in relation to s 38 of the 1973 Act, the 
meaning of ‘subscription’ as provided for in Gold Fields by the Supreme Court of 
Appeal may possibly have a negative impact. She states that,  
should the prohibition against a company giving financial assistance 
for the subscription of its shares be extended to apply to a share 
exchange transaction, this would have a severe impact on some of the 
Black Economic Empowerment transactions which have recently 
taken place, and which have been justified as being in the public 
interest. The problem of access to capital in empowerment 
transactions has of late been addressed by way of elaborate financing 
structures. These structures are multi-layered and complex, with the 
result that the parties frequently run the risk of contravening s 38. 
Depending on its particular financing structures, it is quite 
conceivable that an empowerment transaction may be seen to have 
effected a share exchange. Extending the meaning of a ‘subscription’ 
to include a share exchange would thus heighten the risk of such a 
transaction being declared void as a contravention of s 38. This result 
was surely not intended by the legislature. 
Consequently, Cassim highlights the evident need to contextualise the meaning of 
the term ‘subscription’ to the uniquely South African economy that embraces BEE 
transactions, that are conspicuously absent in the Australian market. 
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Subscription under the 1973 Act 
Although, the term ‘subscription’ is not defined in the 1973 Act, this did not prevent 
both the High Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal in Gold Fields from looking 
to other sections of the 1973 Act, in an effort to decipher its meaning. The Supreme 
Court of Appeal was of the opinion that sections 76(1) and (2), 77(2), 92 and 165(3) 
of the Companies Act that deal with the issue and allotment of shares in return for 
‘consideration other than cash’, shows that the legislature ‘did not intend the word to 
bear the restricted meaning’, for it would consequently, be ‘difficult to see how the 
subscription and allotment would then coincide.’123 The intention of the 
aforementioned sections appears to indicate that any consideration, and not only 
cash, will suffice.124 Arguably, as these sections refer to issue and allotment, it is 
difficult to visualise that one would subscribe to such shares; furthermore, the issue 
and allotment of shares does not always arise from a subscription for shares.125 For 
instance, with the use of shares as payment for services rendered, the company may 
allot and issue the shares to the service provider as fully paid up shares.  
 It has been persuasively suggested that the approach by Goldblatt J in the 
court a quo, to rely on s 165 of the 1973 Act rather than follow the Broken Hill 
decision126 was the correct approach .127 Section 165 of the 1973 Act provided that 
no shares were to be allotted on any application made in pursuance of a prospectus 
for subscription unless the minimum amount stated had been raised. The ‘minimum 
subscription’ referred to in s 165 therefore implied a cash amount.128 Furthermore,    
s 165(3) stated that the determination of the ‘minimum subscription’ takes account of 
amounts payable in cash.129 Consequently, s 165 was indicative of the assumption 
that only a cash consideration for the acquisition of shares was to be included in the 
meaning of the term ‘subscription’.  
It is therefore submitted that it was not reasonable to rely on the decision of 
Broken Hill as it would create regulatory arbitrage between the different sections in 
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  Gold Fields Limited v Harmony Gold Mining Limited supra note 77 para 9. 
124 Piet Delport Offer to the 'Public': Even More Disharmony17 S. Afr. Mercantile L.J. 388 (2005) 
389. 
125 Maleka Femida Cassim op cit note 84 at 273; F H I Cassim  ‘Company Law (Including Close 
Corporations)  2005’ Ann. Surv. S. African L. 466 (2005) 483. 
126	  Gold Fields Limited v Harmony Gold Mining Limited supra note 78 para 9-10.	  
127	  Maleka Femida Cassim op cit note 84 at 273. 
128 Gold Fields Limited v Harmony Gold Mining Limited supra note 78 para 9-10. 
129 Ibid para 9; Maleka Femida Cassim op cit 84 at 273. 
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the 1973 Act rather than aligning them.130 It therefore, follows that the term 
‘subscription’ is limited to situations where cash is paid for shares.131 This would 
result in the case of a share exchange, in the value of the shares not being considered 
in calculating the ‘minimum subscription’, denoting that no subscriptions had taken 
place.132         
 Some jurists have held that there is authority in South Africa that states, ‘that 
if no part of the consideration for delivery of a res, is in cash, the contract cannot be 
considered, as one of purchase, but rather that of barter’.133 MF Cassim, suggests that 
the aforementioned principle should have been followed with respect to the Gold 
Fields decision in relation to the term ‘subscription’; that is a share exchange is not a 
subscription, because neither a barter nor a share exchange amounts to a 
‘subscription.134         
 In English law it was an accepted position that the definition of ‘subscription’ 
could not be judicially extended to include a share exchange, rather the legislature 
amended the term to include a share exchange transaction.135 The South African 
company law foundation is based and is highly influenced by the English company 
law, as such it stands to reason, that it should have followed the approach set by the 
English legislature.136 
Conclusion 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, one of the functions of the company law is to protect 
investors. The English Legislature went further and determined that even when 
shares are acquired through an exchange of shares, the investor should be protected 
by legislation.137 Accordingly, the legislature decided to amend legislation in order to 
incorporate this into their law. Conversely, in Broken Hill even though the court 
acknowledged the need to protect investors to whom a share exchange is offered, in 
contrast to the English position, its approach was to extend the definition of the term 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130 Ibid. 
131  Maleka Femida Cassim op cit note 84 at 273. 
132 Ibid. 
133 Mountbatten Investments (Pty) Ltd v Mohamed 1989 (1) SA 172 (D), R, C Beuthin & S M Luiz 
Beuthin's Basic Company Law 3ed (2000) 91. 
134 Maleka Femida Cassim op cit note 84 at 273. 
135Ibid at 274. 
136 Ibid. 
137 L C B Gower The Review of Investor Protection (1984) Cmnd 9125. 
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‘subscription’.138 In South Africa the Department of Trade and Industry policy 
document also emphasised the need to provide investors with adequate protection,139 
it is therefore not the role of the courts to amend the law, by ‘artificially stretching’ 
the meaning of the term ‘subscription’ as this has ramifications on the interpretation 
and application of other sections of the Act where reference is made to the term 
‘subscription’.140 The role of the court is to interpret and apply the law, accordingly, 
it is submitted that the Supreme Court of Appeal in Gold Fields should, therefore, 
have left the extension of the investor protection to the legislature.141 Implicit in the 
approach followed in Gold Fields  by the Supreme Court of Appeal is that a share 
exchange can qualify as a subscription for shares, this had the effect that a prospectus 
requirement in terms of Chapter VI of the 1973 Act had to have been complied with 
if a share exchange offer was made to the public.142  
Offer to the public 	  
The definition of an ‘offer to the public’ was set out in s 142 of the 1973 Act, it 
stated that an offer to the public,  
includes an offer of shares to any section of the public, whether 
selected as members or debenture holders of the company concerned 
or as clients of the person issuing the prospectus concerned or in any 
other manner.  
Piet Delport, cogently submits that the reasoning of the court in Gold Fields was 
unsound in respect of the meaning of the term ‘public’. He states that the meaning 
was clearly and exhaustively defined in s 142(1); the definition was broken down 
into two distinct aspects; an offer to the ‘public’ and an offer to a ‘section of the 
public’ that are selected in any other manner.143 The meaning in s 142(1) had an 
unlimited application curtailed only by the exemptions found in s 144.144 Therefore, 
an offer to the public, was an offer to ‘all and sundry’ or to the public at large.145 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138 Broken Hill Proprietary Co Ltd v Bell Resources Ltd supra at 617; Maleka Femida Cassim op cit 
note 84 at 274. 
139 The Department of Trade and Industry, South African Company Law for the 21st Century- 
Guidelines for Corporate Law Reform Government, Gazette 26493 of 23 June 2004 para 4.3 at 34. 
140 Maleka Femida Cassim op cit note 84  at 274. 
141 Ibid. 
142 Piet Delport op cit note 124 at 390. 
143 Ibid at 392. 
144	  HS Cilliers, ML Benade, & JJ Henning op cit note 16 at 259. 
145 Lynde v Nash ([1928] 2 KB 93 at 116): 
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Accordingly, ‘if the offer was one not made to the ‘public’ at large, but to a ‘section 
of the public’, the definition made it clear that however the selection was made (‘in 
any other manner’), it would still be an ‘offer to the public’ for purposes of Chapter 
VI’.146 This clearly was not the position followed in Gold Fields, where both courts 
made the distinction that the group in question was not a ‘section of the public’ but 
rather a ‘specific and peculiar group’ that was not covered by the 1973 Act 
provisions.          
 Piet Delport is critical of the court’s reliance on the meaning of ‘public’ in     
S v V147 and in S v Rossouw148 he submits that reliance on these cases is unsuitable as 
it may only serve to establish the meaning of ‘public’ at large, which was not the 
issue in Gold Fields, as it dealt with a ‘section of the public’.149    
 The meaning of ‘public’ in s 142 (1) implies that in an event where a specific 
group is the only one capable of accepting an offer it may still be an ‘offer to the 
public’.150 The salient question, therefore, arises, where an offer is made to a group, 
whether that group constitutes a ‘section of the public’.151 This is because for some 
purposes and in some circumstances, a group may constitute a section of the public 
but in other circumstances the same group may be regarded as distinct from a section 
of the public.152 What constitutes an ‘offer to the public’ is the generality of the 
offer.153 Consequently, both courts in Gold Fields had to decide whether the 
shareholders of Gold Fields constituted a ‘section of the public’ under the particular 
circumstances. The High Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal in Gold Fields 
both ruled in favour of Harmony Gold, deciding that its offer to the Gold Fields 
shareholders was neither an ‘offer to the public’ nor an offer to a ‘section of the 
public’, as such, the offer did not need to comply with the requirements of s 145 of 
the 1973 Act, by providing a prospectus. Accordingly, a Gold Fields-type offer 
would not constitute an ‘offer to the public’ within the meaning of s 142 of the 
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  Piet Delport op cit note 124 at 392.	  
147 1977 (2) SA 134 (T). 
148 1968 (4) SA 380 (T) 
149 Piet Delport op cit 124 at 392. 
150 MS Blackman op cit note 24 at 6-4  (Revision service 3, 2006). 
151 MS Blackman, op cit note 24 at  6-3; Hurst v Vestcorp supra note 44 at 25-6. 
152 Corporate Affairs Commission (SA) v Australian Control Credit Union supra note 39 para 8.  
153 MS Blackman op cit note 24 at 6-4  (Revision service 3, 2006);  Hurst v Vestcorp supra note 44 at 
43. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
24	  
	  
	  
	  
Act.154  This follows the decision by King CJ in Australian Control Credit 
Union v Corporate Affairs Commission155  where he held that, 
Where an offer or invitation is made to a group, it can only be 
regarded as made to a section of the public if it is made to members of 
the group in their character as members of the public and not in any 
private or domestic or other non-public character. 
 The process followed by the Supreme Court of Appeal, was to look at the meaning 
of ‘public’ as used in s 145. Nugent JA, held that the ‘word is not used in s 145 in 
any special sense’,156 and that the offer must be viewed as an offer properly made to 
the public as that term is ‘ordinarily understood’;157 that is an offer that ‘would 
necessarily be in terms that would enable it to be offered to a d accepted by the 
public at large, and could thus be made with indifference to any random section of 
the public’.158          
 The High Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal in Gold Fields had to deal 
with an offer aimed at acquiring ‘specific private property’, directed to, and capable 
of being accepted by, only the owners of the property.159 Furthermore, the Supreme 
Court of Appeal applied the ‘rational connexion’160 between the offer and 
characteristic that sets the group apart,161 resulting in the court deciding that the offer 
was not made to the ‘public’, but rather to shareholders of Gold Fields who are not,  
in that capacity, a mere section of the public at large’.162  
Rational Connection 
The rational connection as it was expounded in the Australian case of Corporate 
Affairs Commission states, that the question whether a particular group of persons 
constitutes a ‘section of the public’ ‘for the purposes of s.5(4) of the Code cannot be 
answered in the abstract’, but rather on a case by case basis.163 Consequently, a pre-
condition must generally exist when determining whether the offer constitutes an 
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  Maleka Femida Cassim op cit note 84 at 275. 
155 Australian Control Credit Union v Corporate Affairs Commission (SA) and another 9 ACER 718. 
156 Gold Fields Ltd v Harmony Gold Mining Ltd supra note 77 para 11. 
157 Ibid para 12. 
158 Ibid para 13. 
159 Ibid para 14-16; Gold Fields Ltd v Harmony Gold Mining Ltd supra note 78para 12. 
160 Corporate Affairs Commission (SA) v Australian Central Credit Union supra note 39.	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  Gold Fields Ltd v Harmony Gold Mining Ltd supra note 77 para 14. 
162 Ibid para 16. 
163	  Corporate Affairs Commission (SA) v Australian Central Credit Union supra note 39 para 8.	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‘offer to the public’, either: there is the absence of some subsisting relationship 
between the offeror and the members of the offeree group; or there is the absence of 
a rational connection between the common characteristic of members of a group and 
the offer made to them.164  Should the pre-condition exist then, 
the question whether the group constitutes a section of the public for 
the purposes of the offer will fall to be determined by reference to a 
variety of factors of which the most important will ordinarily be: the 
number of persons comprising the group, the subsisting relationship 
between the offeror and the members of the group, the nature and 
content of the offer, the significance of any particular characteristic 
which identifies the members of the group and any connection 
between that characteristic and the offer.165 
None of the aforementioned factors are conclusively, determinative of the 
fact on their own they must be applied to the facts of the case together.166 The court 
in Corporate Affairs Commission held that the question of whether an offer is one to 
the ‘public’ is a matter of fact that depends on the purpose and circumstances of the 
offer and is determined by a weighing-up of all the above mentioned factors, once 
the existence of the pre-condition has been established.167    
 F H I Cassim  suggests in reference to Gold Fields ‘that on a weighing-up of 
the factors both favouring and militating against a view that the offer was one to a 
‘section of the public’, the better conclusion is that the offer was one to a ‘section of 
the public’’.168          
 In light of the above it is unfortunate that The Supreme Court of Appeal in 
Gold Fields169 merely scraped the surface of the test laid down in Corporate Affairs 
Commission. The court stated ‘that there is a rational connection between the offer 
and the characteristic that sets the group apart… hardly needs saying for the 
characteristic is inherent in the offer itself’.170 The court recognised the presence of 
rational connection which is the pre-condition, and hinted to the nature of the offer 
and the significance of the identifying characteristic of the group, but this is only part 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
164 Ibid. 
165 Corporate Affairs Commission (SA) v Australian Central Credit Union supra para. 
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  O’Brien v Melbank Corp Ltd (1991) 7 ACSR 19 SC (Vic) 38-9. 
167 F H I Cassim op cit note 125 at 484. 
168Ibid. 
169 Gold Fields Ltd v Harmony Gold Mining Ltd supra para 14-16 
170 Ibid para 14	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of the test to determine an ‘offer to the public’,171 the court omitted the second half of 
the test.         
 Nugent J in determining that the offer was not one to a ‘section of the public’ 
held that, ‘the fact that the owner of the property might live amongst us in society 
does not mean that the offer is addressed to him as a ‘section of the public’. On the 
contrary, he is addressed in  the peculiar capacity - not shared by the public at large - 
of owner of specific limited property’.172 Not only does this approach not provide 
any guidance in determining the meaning of a ‘section of the public’ but rather aids 
in confusing the matter.173 Piet Delport succinctly points out that the ‘peculiar 
capacity’ that distinguishes a group as ‘non-public’ is not  sufficient, proof  just as 
having the ‘rational connection’ between the group and the offeror,  if the ‘rational 
connection’ is merely an offer to acquire that which causes the ‘peculiar capacity’ to 
include a person in the group’.174 It is respectfully submitted that the Supreme Court 
of Appeal and the High Court, after having considered the pre-condition, (the 
rational connection) should then have considered the variety of factors stated in 
Corporate Affairs Commission, which determine whether an offer is a public or 
private one. Additionally, the two courts should have also looked at the ‘special 
interest’ criterion expounded by Brennan J.175  Notably the criterion referred to above 
relates to the ‘special interest of the offerees and not that of the offeror in the subject 
matter of the offer’.176 Conversely, in Gold Fields the two courts placed great 
emphasis on the special interest of the offeror in the acceptance of the offer, rather 
than on the special interest of the offeree in the offer.177 This is evidenced by the 
statements by the two courts that the offer by Harmony was not to the public because 
its goal was to acquire ‘specific private property’ in order to effect a merger.178 
However, there is as yet no ‘authority as to the view that an offer is not one to a 
‘section of the public’ if the offeror (‘as opposed to the offerees’) has a special 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
171 Maleka Femida Cassim op cit note 84 at 277. 
172 Gold Fields v Harmony Gold supra note 77 para 14.	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  Piet Delport op cit note 124 at 393.	  
174Ibid.	  
175 Corporate Affairs Commission (SA) v Australian Central Credit Union supra note 39 para 6; Hurst 
v Vestcorp supra note 44 at 45-6. Which further enhances the criterion  by determining whether the 
offerees, ‘by reason of their antecedent relationship with the offeror, have an interest in the subject 
matter of the offer substantially greater than or substantially different from the interest which others 
who do not have that relationship would have in the subject matter of the offer’. 
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  Maleka Femida Cassim op cit note 84 at 277.	  
177Ibid. 
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  Ibid, Gold Fields v Harmony Gold supra note 77 para 14 & 16 , and supra note 78 para 12 .	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interest in the acceptance of the offer’ This question was left open by Brennan J in 
Corporate Affairs Commission.179 In light of the above it is much more logical to 
read s 145, from the ‘perspective of the special interest of the offeree’, with respect 
to the need for a prospectus.180 The crux of the matter therefore should be,  
whether the subscription component of Harmony’s proposal (that is, 
the offer to subscribe for shares in Harmony) constituted an offer to 
the public; and not whether the taking up of Gold Fields shares by 
Harmony constituted an offer to the public.181 
Accordingly, the High Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal should have 
considered the matter from the perspective of the ‘special interest’ of the members of 
Gold Fields and not Harmony (additionally Harmony does not require the protection 
of s145), as there is no authority for the approach followed.    
 Accordingly, the court failed to apply correctly the pre-condition criterion test 
to the facts of Gold Fields. In correctly applying the test, the two courts should have 
realised that the members of Gold Fields, did not have a special interest in acquiring 
shares in Harmony that was ‘substantially greater than or different from the interest’ 
of those who did not hold shares in Gold Fields and should therefore have been 
afforded the protection of a prospectus.182 Thus the non-fulfilment of the 
aforementioned criterion is an indication that the offer in Gold Fields was one to a 
‘section of the public’.183         
 On the other hand it has been suggested that the reliance by the Supreme 
Court of Appeal and the High Court on Corporate Affairs Commission is 
inappropriate because of the differences found between the Companies (South 
Australia) Code and the wording of s 142(1) of the 1973 Act.184 Section 5(4) of the 
Code states: 
 a reference in this Code to, or to the making of, an offer to the public, 
or to the issuing of, an invitation to the public shall, unless the 
contrary intention appears, be construed as including a reference to, or 
to the making of, an offer to any section of the public ..... 
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This is indistinguishable from the definition in s 84bis of the repealed South African 
Companies Act of 1926, ‘it did not define ‘public’ but rather included in the ordinary 
meaning of ‘public’ also a section of the public’.185 This meant that it was possible 
under the South Australian code and the repealed s84bis, to ‘establish a non-public 
category that fell outside the expressly included exceptions’,186 this could be 
attributed to the fact that the exemptions in s 5(4) are not exhaustive.187 This creates 
an untenable situation, as the court then creates a common law ‘non-public’ category, 
outside what the legislature intended under the Act thereby creating more confusion 
to an already unsettled area of law. 
Application of a variety of factors	  
In Corporate Affairs Commission it was held that a variety of factors in addition to 
the pre-condition were determinative of whether an offer is one to the public. Both 
the High Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal cited with approval the TNT 
Australia (Pty) Ltd v Normandy Resources NL188 (‘Normandy Resources’) case. It 
has been suggested that the decision in Normandy Resources was a result of a 
restrictive interpretation of the term ‘public’.189 In Normandy Resources it was held 
that a gold fields type offer was not one to the ‘public’.    
 M F Cassim persuasively queries whether the High Court and Supreme Court 
of Appeal should have followed the decision in Normandy Resources, because like 
the facts in Gold Fields the facts in the Normandy Resources case were not 
persuasive, as the facts in the Corporate Affairs Commission case were, in 
determining that the offer was a private one.190      
 As previously highlighted, aside from establishing a pre-condition that is, the 
shared common characteristic amongst group members or either an antecedent 
relationship between the offerees and the offeror, the Corporate Affairs Commission 
case also, laid down four other factors that are to be considered with the pre-
condition criteria, which support the view that the offer in Gold Fields was 
undeniably an offer to a ‘section of the public’. The four other factors include, the 
number of persons comprising the group, the subsisting relationship between the 
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offeror and the members of the group, the nature and content of the offer, the 
significance of any particular characteristic which identifies the members of the 
group and any connection between that characteristic and the offer.191  
 The court in Corporate Affairs Commission held that ‘the characteristic 
which sets the proposed offerees apart as a group is both restrictive and well-
defined’, in that case it was held that membership was the characteristic that set the 
group apart in that, the rules of ACCU restricted eligibility ‘for membership by 
reference to employment and/or residence and prescribed clear procedures for 
applications for membership and their rejection or acceptance’.192    
 The common characteristic of the shareholders of Gold Fields was certainly 
not a restrictive one, anyone could purchase Gold Fields shares at any point in time 
as they were listed and become an offeree at the time the offer was made, there was 
clearly an absence of a restrictive eligibility criteria for membership into the group, 
furthermore it was not a well-defined group.193 Like the court in Normandy 
Resources the Supreme Court of Appeal rejected the aforementioned when submitted 
on behalf of Gold Fields.194 Unlike the rules of the ACCU, there were no clearly 
defined procedures for acceptance and rejection of an offer for the subscription by a 
member of the public to purchase Gold Fields shares neither was there any certainty 
as to the identity of the offerees, therefore, the group was not well defined.195 
Implicit in this approach is the view that the Harmony offer was a ‘public offer’.
 The rational connection factor refers to the significance of any particular 
characteristic which identifies the members of the group and any connection between 
that characteristic and the offer.  In Gold Fields there was the absence of a rational 
connection between the shared common characteristic of the group and the nature of 
the offer, in that the Gold Field shareholders had no interest in Harmony, if anything 
Harmony had a special interest in the Gold Fields shareholders (offerees) accepting 
their offer, and transferring their shares to Harmony in a process to merge the two 
companies.196 The circumstances differ from those in Corporate Affairs Commission, 
where there was clearly a rational connection between membership of the union and 
the beneficial ownership of the new headquarters of the union, as members already 
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had an indirect interest through their membership in the union.197  Accordingly, it has 
been cogently submitted that the court in Gold Fields missed the important point 
‘that the rationality of the connection must be judged in the light of the particular 
context of investor protection’, therefore, the Harmony offer to Gold Field’s 
shareholders, lacked the rational connection in the context of investor protection.198  
 The criterion of the ‘public’ laid down in Hurst v Vestcorp held that the type 
of relationship between an investor and the offeror may be used to exempt the 
requirement for a prospectus, as imposing the requirement for a prospectus was held 
to be  artificial, burdensome and unnecessary for the purposes of protecting the 
investor.199 For instance in the case of a friendship, partnership or family relationship 
with the promoter, the relationship in itself is sufficient explanation for the 
investment, unlike the case where no relationship exits.200 The Gold Fields 
shareholders had no such relationship with Harmony and as such possibly required a 
prospectus in order to make an informed decision; therefore, the court should have 
held the offer as one made to a ‘section of the public’.201   
 Additionally, the size of the group of offerees may be determinative of the 
group being a section of the public albeit no particular number may be deemed to 
constitute the ‘public’ or a ‘section of the public’.202 However, it is possible for the 
large number of Gold Fields shareholders to have been considered large enough to be 
defined as a ‘section of the public’; consequently the court in Gold Fields should 
have taken this into consideration in addition to the rationale connection criteria.   
Authority referred to in Gold Fields 
Both courts in Gold Fields referred to the Normandy Resources decision where it 
was held that an offer to members of a particular company was not an offer to the 
public. 203 It is rather surprising that the Supreme Court of Appeal did not follow the 
decision in Broken Hill with respect to the issue of an ‘offer to the public’, although 
it had followed the court’s decision with respect to the meaning of the term 
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‘subscription’. In Broken Hill204 it was held that a gold fields-type offer was one to 
the public, but, the court did not explore the issue further. It is possible that this could 
very well be the reason as to why the Supreme Court of appeal in Gold Fields  did 
not follow this decision; that is the  absence of an in depth analysis of the reason why 
the court in Broken Hill held that the offer was one to the public. If this is the case, 
then the court in Gold Fields should not have followed Broken Hill’s decision with 
respect to the meaning of subscription as there was no supporting authority to 
substantiate that decision either.         
 The facts in Normandy Resources are strikingly similar to the facts in Gold 
Fields. The case held that a gold fields-type offer was not one to the ‘public’.  It has 
been suggested that Normandy Resources should have been distinguished from Gold 
Fields case because the court in Normandy Resources had to decide ‘whether the 
exchange-right component of the offer constituted an offer to the public’, which, 
consequently, may be distinguished from Gold Fields where there was no ‘exchange-
right component in issue’.205 When a shareholder in Normandy Resources ‘decided 
to exercise their exchange right, they would by that time, be a member of the 
company’, implicit in the court’s decision is the idea that there might have been ‘an 
antecedent relationship between the offeror and the offeree’, which was held in the 
Corporate Affairs Commission to be a significant factor in favour ‘of an offer being a 
non-public one’.206 Conversely, in Gold Fields, the court did not have to deal with 
the issue of an exchange right as the offer was an exchange of shares, and as such 
there was ‘no antecedent relationship between the offeror and the offeree’; 
accordingly, the court has been criticised in failing ‘to take into account the absence 
of an antecedent relationship’.207 Furthermore, it has been suggested that the court in 
Normandy Resources loosely applied the criteria in Corporate Affairs Commission, 
and ‘relied on outdated dicta’ as authority for its decision.208 It applied the dictum of 
Kitto J and of Barwick CJ in Lee v Evan;209 that states ‘an invitation is not an 
invitation to the public unless it is, an invitation made to the public generally and 
capable therefore of being acted upon by any member of the public’.210 However, the 
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dictum was made in the context of repealed legislative provisions that were replaced 
by a more ‘expansive definition of an offer to the public’.211 The Corporate Affairs 
Commission case, clearly held that the legislature in respect of s.5(4) of the 
Companies Code (South Australia), intended to expand the meaning of the term 
public to include a section of the public however selected,212 and ‘exclude the direct 
applicability of Lee v Evans’.213 Cassim  submits that Normandy Resources’s 
application of the dicta in Lee v Evans is ‘flawed’ and by association the Supreme 
Court of Appeal in Gold Fields seems to have followed the ‘flawed reasoning’ in 
Normandy Resources214 when the court held, that ‘an offer that is made to the public 
would necessarily be in terms that would enable it to be made to and accepted by the 
public at large’.215 
Conclusion 
The courts in Gold Fields, took a narrow view of what w uld constitute an offer to 
the ‘public’ or a ‘section of the public’, and  failed to take account of significant 
factors that pointed to the offer being one to the ‘public’ and consequently, requiring 
a prospectus. On a closer analysis of Broken Hill and Normandy Resources and the 
facts in Gold Fields the only logical conclusion is that the offer in Gold Fields was 
one made to a ‘section of the public’.216 Even in a share exchange transaction, 
investors may require greater protection through a prospectus.217 It is highly likely 
that shareholders with large share portfolios are actually not very knowledgeable 
with respect to the workings of companies or the workings of equity, they therefore 
may not be properly informed to make a decision, whether to accept the offer or 
not.218           
 In Gold Fields there was clearly no subsisting relationship between the 
offeror and the offerees, the court should have held the offer to be one to a ‘section 
of the public’, which would have required Harmony to provide a prospectus to the 
shareholders of Gold Fields.        
 Against this backdrop, there are grounds for highlighting the need for the 
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legislature to provide adequate investor protection in line with international best 
practice. This shall be discussed in detail in the following section.    
Chapter 3: Developments to  company law in South Africa, the 
United Kingdom and Australia 
South Africa Company Law reform 	  
The economic and political landscape in South Africa and globally has changed 
considerably over the past 20 years. The manner in which business is conducted 
throughout most of the world has undergone radical change, the ease of global travel, 
and the telecommunication revolution have resulted in an exponential increase in 
global and cross border transactions. The end result was the globalisation of 
business, which has led businesses to lobby the government to harmonise laws 
especially laws ‘governing cross border trade, of which company law forms an 
integral part’.219         
 Internationally, the framework upon which the South African company law is 
based saw significant changes made to it. In 1998 the British Department of Trade 
and Industry (now the ‘Department for Business, Innovation and Skills’) published a 
Consultation Paper entitled Modern Company Law – for a Competitive Economy, 
which launched a fundamental review of the company law, resulting in the 
Companies Act 2006.220       
 Even though changes were happening in the business world, and in other 
jurisdictions, the same could not be said of the Companies Act 61 of 1973. The 1973 
Act was in force for 37 years, and during that time it was amended approximately 42 
times, resulting in a bulky piece of legislation; cumbersome, complex, archaic, 
‘excessively technical and full of conflict in its underlying philosophy and policy’.221 
The need for a new companies act was evident. A new Act that would incorporate 
the fundamental legal developments that had occurred in South Africa,222 not least of 
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which, was the adoption of the Constitution in 1996.223  Furthermore, the South 
African Legislature had no choice but to take stock after global corporate failures 
that occurred at Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, Adelphia, Vivendi and Parmalat, to name 
but a few,224 one of which lead to the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the 
United States of America.225       
 This led the Department of Trade and Industry (‘DTI’) in 2004, to publish a 
policy paper, entitled South African Company Law for the 21st Century – Guidelines 
for Corporate Law Reform (‘Policy Paper’).226 The policy paper highlighted the need 
to develop a ‘clear, facilitating, predictable and consistently enforced law’ that would 
be able to provide ‘a protective and fertile environment for economic activity’.227 
The scope of the review would encompass company law, that is; the Companies Act 
61 of 1973, the Close Corporations Act 1984, and the common law.228   
 In the policy paper the DTI, acknowledged that vast changes had occurred in 
the corporate world: old concepts and corporate structures and financial instruments 
had been abandoned or modified and new ones developed; the world had become a 
global economy, with increased electronic communication, greater sensitivity to 
social and ethical concerns, evolving markets, and increased competition for capital, 
goods and services.229 In light of this, South Africa should not be left behind, and its 
company law regime should be aligned with international best practice, through 
harmonisation and modernisation of company law.230  When modernising company 
law, and aligning it to international best practice it has been advised, that ‘care must 
be taken to avoid unthinking adoption of ideas which depend for their effectiveness 
on the environment in which they have been developed’.231 This is in line with the 
objectives of the DTI; it believed that the new legislation should be appropriate to the 
unique South African legal, economic and social context.232   
 The DTI believed that the harmonisation of South African company law with 
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other company law locally and internationally would reduce uncertainty and the cost 
of implementation of the new regime, for foreign companies and investors in South 
Africa, as well as local companies involved in international trade and investment.233  
Inevitably, the question is raised, whether through harmonisation with international 
best practice, a level of certainty for investors and a reduction of cost has been 
achieved, with the Companies Act 71 of 2008.      
 In addition to the harmonisation of company law, it must also, be aligned 
with the Constitution of South Africa in particular the principles of equity and 
fairness, and also with other pieces of legislation,  specifically the Competition 
Act234 and Promotion of Access to Information Act.235 Moreover, company law must 
be simple, comprehensive, ‘facilitative, enabling and flexible’, in addition to being 
accessible to all.236        
 The DTI’s intention was clear; it wanted to carry out an overhaul of the 
company law in South Africa where it was necessary and not merely to amend 
existing legislation, viz the Companies Act 61 of 1973, or aimed at ‘unreasonably 
jettisoning the body of jurisprudence built up over more than a century’.237   
 One of the core areas that the DTI policy review looked at was the area of 
corporate finance. The DTI determined that corporate financing was a core aspect of 
company law, that has a major impact on shareholders and investors, and as such this 
area of company law should provide shareholders and investors with adequate 
protection.238 Other areas identified for reform were in the realm of corporate 
formation which required simplification of the process as the 1973 Act was 
cumbersome and the area of corporate governance to mention just a few.239 
 Consequently, taking into account the uniquely South African economic 
context, the DTI believed that the best way for company law to promote the 
competitiveness and development of the South African economy is by:  
encouraging entrepreneurship and enterprise diversity by simplifying 
the formation of companies and reducing costs associated with the 
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formalities of forming a company and maintaining its existence, 
thereby contributing to the creation of employment opportunities; 
promoting innovation and investment in the South African markets 
and companies by providing a predictable and effective regulatory 
environment and flexibility in the formation and the management of 
companies; promoting the efficiency of companies and their 
management; encouraging transparency and high standards of 
corporate governance, recognising the broader social role of 
enterprises; ensuring compatibility and harmonisation with best-
practice jurisdictions internationally.240   
These objectives are clearly reflected in s 7 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 Act 
(‘2008 Act’) that deals with the  purposes of the legislation,241 and it is of paramount 
importance that these principles should be applied when a matter is brought before 
the court,242 this would lead to the consistent application of company law.  
 After ‘over six years of deliberation, discussion and debate’ the new 
Companies Act 71 of 2008, was signed into law by the president on 8 April 2009. 
Whilst, it has been suggested that the new Act may remove some of the convolutions 
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of the 1973 Act, it is a possibility that new convolutions will take their place.243  It 
therefore, remains to be seen whether the policy considerations underlying the Act 
are being advanced or hindered by the provisions contained in the 2008 Act. We wait 
to see the different matters that will be brought before the courts with respect to the 
provisions of the 2008 Act, to determine whether, and to what extent, the new Act is 
an improvement on the 1973 Act. 
The framework and the structure of the 2008 Act	  
The 2008 Act comprises of nine chapters and five schedules, it is clearly not a ‘self-
contained code and does not consolidate the whole of corporate law’.244 It has 
introduced some innovative provisions, which include the general interpretation of 
the provisions of the Act, which amongst other things allows the court to consider 
foreign company law when interpreting or applying the Act.245 The section is 
‘permissive and not absolute’,246 meaning that it is at the court’s discretion whether 
to use foreign company law or not. Though it is innovative and, in some respects 
even revolutionary, in some instances it is also complex in its structure and 
philosophy.247 Although there are a number of similarities between the 1973 Act and 
the 2008 Act, by and large the 2008 Act is entirely different from the 1973 Act in 
most respects.248 The 2008 Act is much easier to read and understand, than its 
predecessor, as it is written in modern English.249     
 It has been suggested, that the corporate environment has moved from a 
‘prohibitive and restrictive model to a more enabling or facilitative one’,250 this can 
be surmised from the fact that the 2008 Act facilitates efficient investment and 
growth by simplifying the incorporation process, as ‘unnecessary hurdles and 
obstacles that obstruct company formation and make it a cumbersome process’ have 
been jettisoned from the Act.251 The process has been simplified for instance there 
are less requirements and technicalities which allow ‘one or more individuals, or an 
organ of state, to incorporate a profit company, and an organ of state, a juristic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
243 Farouk HI Cassim Introduction to the New Companies Act op cit note 221 at 27. 
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245 Companies Act 71 of 2008 s5(2). 
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person, or three or more persons acting in concert, may incorporate a non-profit 
company’.252           
 Most archaic and obsolete concepts and doctrines have been jettisoned; most 
noteworthy is the ‘capital maintenance rule’ that ‘regards the issued share capital of 
the company as a permanent fund intended for payment of claims by the company’s 
creditors’.253 In its stead the 2008 Act adopts the test of solvency and liquidity found 
in s 4,254 unlike the capital maintenance rule, the solvency and liquidity test protects 
the creditor as well as the minority shareholder. Other modern concepts introduced 
by the Act include, the concept of related and inter-related persons;255 the Act also 
introduces the innovative concept of a statutory merger;256 the concept of business 
rescue257 which focuses on the rehabilitation of a business rather than it’s winding 
up, and last but not least there is also the partial codification of directors’ duties, the 
main objective of which, is to make directors aware of their fiduciary duties.258 
 Of particular relevance to this discussion is the anti-avoidance provision 
located in s 6, in particular subsections 4 and 5. The anti-avoidance provisions aims 
to prevent activities that are primarily and substantially intended to subvert or reduce 
the effects of a requirement established by an unalterable provision.259 Subsection 5 
requires documents, including prospectuses, to be in plain language, the prospectus is 
compliant when it is ‘reasonable to conclude that a person of the class of persons for 
whom the document is intended, with average literacy skills and minimal experience 
in dealing with company law matters, could be expected to understand the content, 
significance and import of the information’.260 The section embraces a substance 
over form approach, it implies that if a document deviates from the requirements 
established by the provisions of the act and in so doing it ‘negatively and materially 
affects the substance or would reasonably mislead a person reading the document or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
252 Companies Act 71 of 2008 s13(1). 
253 Ibid at 11. 
254 Ibid. 
255Ibid at 16; Companies Act 71 of 2008 S2. 
256 Ibid s113; modelled on the Delaware General Corporations Law. 
257Companies Act 71 of 2008, Chapter 6; modelled on chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Reform Act 
1978. 
258 Farouk HI Cassim Introduction to the New Companies Act op cit note 221 at 19. This follows the 
approach adopted in Australia, New Zealand and United Kingdom. Disadvantage of this approach is 
that it is a one size fits all approach. 
259 P. A. Delport, Q Vorster ,  Edgar S Henochsberg, Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008  
(2011) s6. 
260	  Ibid.	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to whom the document is delivered’ then the document would be invalid.261 These 
provisions provide investor protection, because non-compliance may lead to civil and 
criminal liability.262           
Chapter 4 of the 2008 Act Public Offerings of Company Securities 	  
Chapter 4 is an important aspect of company law as it deals with public offerings of 
company securities, in another sense it regulates the fundraising activities of a 
company. The objective of the chapter is the protection of potential investors, by 
ensuring that companies that offer securities to the public provide adequate 
information, to enable them to make well informed investment decisions.263 This is 
well illustrated in s 95(5) and (6); which states that a provision that requires an 
applicant to waive compliance with a requirement of chapter 4 is void, and a 
provision of an agreement is also void to the extent that it purports to affect an 
applicant for securities with any notice of any agreement, document or matter not 
specifically referred to in a prospectus or written statement in s101. Furthermore, 
nothing in Chapter 4 limits any liability that a person may incur under any other 
provisions of the Act, or under any other public regulation, or under the common 
law.264 This would act as a deterrent to those who would otherwise act contrary to 
the provisions in Chapter 4.       
 The crux of chapter 4 is the meaning of ‘offer to the public’. If an offer falls 
outside this meaning the provisions of chapter 4 will not apply.265 The definition of 
the term ‘offer to the public’ is similar to that found in the 1973 Act, therefore, the 
case law on the meaning of the term will most likely remain  relevant under the 2008 
Act.266 However, one difference that the 2008 Act has brought is the introduction of 
three (3) methods of offering securities to the public267 that is through an initial 
public offering,268 a primary offering269 and a secondary offering.270 These methods 
are treated differently, in s 99 specifically in subsections (2) and (3) which provide 
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  Ibid.	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  Companies Act 71 of 2008 s114.	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  Carl Stein; Geoff. K Everingham op cit note 218 at 258. 
264 Companies Act 71 of 2008 s 95(6); Carl Stein; Geoff. K Everingham op cit note 219 at 262. 
265 Ibid at 258. 
266 Ibid. 
267	  Carl Stein; Geoff. K Everingham op cit note 218 at 262.	  
268 Companies Act 71 of 2008 s95(1)(e). 
269 Ibid s95(1)(i). 
270 Ibid s95(1)(m). 
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the manner in which the different offers should be made to the public.271  The section 
highlights the differences ‘between the primary and secondary markets as well as the 
listed and unlisted securities’,272 of which the latter require a prospectus in 
compliance with the Act and the former must comply with the rules of the relevant 
listing exchange.273        
 Notably, the Act recognises that the majority of offers to the public are made 
by listed companies, and that the rules of the relevant exchange provide adequate 
protection to the public, and therefore it is unnecessary for a listed company to have 
to comply with the provisions of the 2008 Act as well as the rules of the exchange.274 
Therefore the distinctions found  in s 99  ‘provide legal clarity and certainty as to the 
relevant requirements’,275 by clarifying the circumstances under which the 
restrictions found in the section apply, by way of illustration, the section specifically 
provides that an initial public offering requires a prospectus regardless of whether the 
company making the offer is a listed entity or not.276 Furthermore, the simplification 
of the law in this area and the enhanced definitions should provide improved 
guidelines to companies and the courts, there should no longer be any remnants of 
doubt of what is required under these circumstances.277 
Development to the UK and Australian Company Legislation 
United Kingdom - Background	  
The Joint Stock Companies Act 1844, aside from setting up the system of 
incorporation by registration, is also significant for early securities regulation, as it 
introduced a requirement for registration of a prospectus when shares were issued to 
the public.278 The main purpose of securities regulation is the protection of investors, 
through the disclosure of all relevant information relating to the company offering 
the securities (shares), in order to empower the investor when making investment 
decisions.279 The Companies Act 1948 s 38(3) like the Stock Companies Act 1844    
s 4, albeit, in a different form prohibited an offer of shares to the public unless the 
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  Carl Stein; Geoff. K Everingham op cit note 219 at 263.	  
272 Jacqueline Yeats Public offerings of company securities op cit note 28 at 117. 
273 Ibid 118. 
274 Carl Stein; Geoff. K Everingham op cit note 219 at 262.	  
275 Jacqueline Yeats Public offerings of company securities op cit note 28 at 119. 
276 Companies Act 71 of 2008 s99(2). 
277 Jacqueline Yeats Public offerings of company securities op cit note 28 at 118. 
278 Joint Stock Companies Act 1844 s4. 
279 John Lowry & Arad Reisberg op cit note 13 at 399. 
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offer was accompanied by a prospectus, which complied with the requirements set 
out in schedule 4 of the Act.280 
United Kingdom - The law review and developments   
For nearly forty years (40) the British government had not carried out a 
comprehensive review of company law. The legal framework was a patchwork of 
complex, bulky and outdated provisions.281 Its desire was to ‘create a modern law for 
a modern state’ and  ‘have an up-to-date framework which promotes the 
competitiveness of UK companies and so contribute to national competitiveness and 
increased prosperity’.282 As already mentioned, an outdated regime necessitated the 
appointment of a Steering Group in the United Kingdom.283 The latter’s terms of 
reference were: 
i. To consider how core company law can be modernised in order to provide a 
simple, efficient and cost-effective framework for carrying out business 
activity which:     
a. permits the maximum amount of freedom and flexibility to those 
organising and directing the enterprise; 
b.  at the same time protects, through regulation where necessary, the 
interests of those involved with the enterprise, including shareholders, 
creditors and employees; and 
c.  is drafted in clear, concise and unambiguous language which can be 
readily understood by those involved in business enterprise. 
to mention but a few.284       
 The then Department of Trade and Industry acknowledged that the existing 
company law was overly complex and poorly laid out, as it was more of a reactive 
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281 United Kingdom, Department of Trade and Industry: Modern Company Law for a Competitive 
Economy 1998 at 1.1 
282 Ibid at 1.2	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  A Consultation Document from The Company Law Review Steering Group, Modern Company 
Law, for a Competitive Economy: The Strategic Framework (1999) at 8. 
284 John Birds, Bryan Clark, Iain MacNeil eds, Boyle & Birds’ Company Law 8ed 2011 at 12, 
Appendix A to the CLRSG Final Report; Modern Company Law, for a Competitive Economy: The 
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Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
42	  
	  
	  
	  
piece of legislation than a proactive one, because previous amendments had been 
done in response to particular market failures.285   
Companies Act 2006 
After years of consultation, the Companies Act 2006 (‘2006 Act’), received Royal 
assent in November 2006, this has been the most comprehensive revision of 
company law since the Jenkins Committee Report in 1962.286 The company law 
provisions of the 2006 Act (Parts 1 to 39) restate or amend almost all of the 
provisions of the Companies Act 1985, together with the company law provisions of 
the Companies Act 1989 (the 1989 Act),287 accordingly there has not been ‘any 
paradigm shift in either the institution of the company or in the legislation dealing 
with it from 1856 to present day’.288   Like the South African Companies Act 71 of 
2008, the Companies Act 2006 also codifies certain aspects of common law such as 
those relating to directors duties.289      
Offers to the public 	  
The 2006 Act has endeavoured to provide clarity and simplicity for users. Under part 
20 (Private and Public Companies) in s 756 the meaning of ‘offer to the public’ is 
defined. It is defined to include an offer to any section of the public, however 
selected,290 and is not an ‘offer to the public’  
if it can properly be regarded, in all the circumstances, as not being 
calculated  to result, directly or indirectly, in securities of the company 
becoming available to persons other than those receiving the offer, or 
otherwise being a private concern of the person receiving it and the 
person making it.291  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
285 Department of Trade and Industry Modern Company Law: For a competitive Economy –Final 
Report  June 2001, CM 5553-I London.	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  United Kingdom, Department of Trade and Industry: Modern Company Law for a Competitive 
Economy 1998 at 2.5.	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  Buckley on the Companies Acts Commentary, available  at  
http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.staffs.ac.uk/uk/legal/results/enhPubTreeViewDoc.do?nodeId=TA
ABAAHAAKAAE&backKey=20_T16377103665&refPt=&pubTreeWidth=472 accessed on  13 
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288Len Sealy, Sarah Worthington Cases and Materials in Company Law (2005) at 5. 
289 Ibid at 3. 
290 Companies Act 2006 S756(2). 
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The section further goes on to establish that an offer is regarded as a ‘private 
concern’, of a person receiving it and the person making it when,  
a. it is made to a person already connected with the company and, where it 
is made on terms allowing that person to renounce his rights, the rights 
may only be renounced in favour of another person already connected 
with the company; or 
b. it is an offer to subscribe for securities to be held under an employees' 
share scheme and, where it is made on terms allowing that person to 
renounce his rights, the rights may only be renounced in favour of— 
i. another person entitled to hold securities under the scheme, or 
ii. a person already connected with the company.292     
Sections 756 (1) and (2), clearly show that an offer to existing members of the 
company is an offer to the public and that an offer to any section of the public 
‘however selected’ is an offer to the public.293 Evidently, in order to be an offer to 
the public, the offer must be made to more than one person,294 for instance it has 
been held that the distribution of a prospectus to 3,000 members of certain gas 
companies was an offer to the public.295 Section 756(3)  would cover inter alia, the 
situation where a company makes a non-renounceable rights offer to its members, 
where the rights offer is renounceable, it will not be an offer to the public if the right 
can only be renounced in favour of another person already ‘connected’ with the 
company.296 Furthermore, the subsection also includes an offer of shares to a few 
institutional investors for the purposes of long-term investment; this would also not 
result in an offer to the public.297 Therefore, in determining whether or not an offer is 
calculated either directly or indirectly to be available to persons other than those to 
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294 Nash v Lynde [1929] AC 158, 98 LJKB 127, HL. 
295 Re South of England Natural Gas and Petroleum Co Ltd [1911] 1 Ch 573, 80 LJ Ch 358. 
296 Buckley on the Companies Acts op cit note 290. 
297 Sleigh v Glasgow & Transvaal Options Ltd (1904) 6 F 420, Ct of Sess; Sherwell v Combined 
Incandescent Mantles Syndicate Ltd [1907] WN 110; Re South of England Natural Gas and 
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whom it is made, the test is not who receives the offer but who can accept it.298 This 
means that the offer should be capable of being accepted by any member of the 
public and not restricted to a select group, that is not considered a ‘section of the 
public’. Even though the section has been amended from that of its predecessor,299 
and is drafted in a manner that provides a great deal of clarity and simplicity, the 
common law that applies to the meaning of ‘offer to the public’ remains applicable. 
Especially for the purposes of establishing, the meaning of ‘offer to the public’ and 
‘subscription’ not much has changed, the old case law is still applicable to today’s 
modern economy. 
Subscription 	  
Under the English Companies Act 1985, an exchange offer was not regarded as 
involving an offer for ‘subscription’ requiring the registration of a prospectus 
because the term ‘subscription’ connoted a subscription for cash.300 
 With respect to the meaning of ‘subscription’ the Companies Act 2006, still 
does not define the term. Accordingly the meaning established in Christopher still 
applies as noted in the decision of Blackburn and another v Revenue and Customs 
Commissioner.301 The case in question involved the injection of capital into the 
company by Blackburn who was part owner of the company, on different occasions. 
The question to be decided upon by the court was whether, when Mr Blackburn gave 
the company capital, it was a loan or an application for the allotment of shares. The 
court looked at the meaning of ‘subscription’ as laid down in Christopher that is the 
‘taking or agreeing to take shares for cash’, and concluded that accordingly, the 
shares had all been subscribed for by Mr Blackburn, and they had not been allotted to 
him until he had paid cash for them.302 This case shows the relevance of case law 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
298 Governments Stock and Other Securities Investment Co Ltd v Christopher supra 237 (which dealt 
with CA 1948, s 55(2)). See also Corporate Affairs Commission (South Australia) v Australia Central 
Credit Union; WA Pines Pty Ltd v National Companies and Securities Commission (1987) 5 ACLC 
487. 
299	  It is clear that section 756 (1)–(4) was derived from the Companies Act 1985, s 742A(1)–(5); sub-s 
(5) derived from the Companies Act 1985, s 742A(3)(a), (6)(b); sub-s (6) derived from the Companies 
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300 Journal of International Banking & Financial Law available at 
http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.staffs.ac.uk/uk/legal/results/enhdocview.do?docLinkInd=true&ers
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301[2008] All ER (D) 199. 
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relating to the meaning of the term ‘subscription’ under the British Companies Act 
2006. 
Conclusion 
The 2006 Act has been held to be the longest Act of Parliament in history with 1,300 
sections and 16 schedules.303 This Act represents a significant improvement on its 
predecessors, although it is still held by some to be, ‘a highly complex piece of 
legislation’, which may possibly be made even more so by the secondary legislation 
that has followed it.304 It remains to be seen whether the Act will fulfil the objectives 
behind the reasons for the Department of Trade and Industry establishing the 
company law review, as the objective to provide flexibility for the future was 
‘substantially removed during the course of the Bill’.305 
Australia 
The Corporate Law Simplification Program (CLSP) was announced in 1993, with the 
aim to simplify and modernise company law.306 This resulted in the First Corporate 
Law Simplification Act 1995 (Commonwealth), of which ‘complexity and 
inflexibility were the acknowledged foes; clarity, simplicity and plain language the 
objectives’.307 It made corporations’ legislation easier to read, it also led to ‘radical 
changes to the structure and c ntent of Australia’s corporations law, thus 
empowering shareholders and investors’ in the process.308  Unfortunately the CLSP 
was disbanded and was no longer part of the law reform process; however, this paved 
the way for the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (CLERP)309, whose 
driving force was economic efficiency, investor protection and market integrity.310 
When launching CLERP in 1997, Federal Treasurer Peter Costello emphasised the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
303 John Birds, Bryan Clark, Iain MacNeil op cit note 282 at 11. 
304 Ibid at 13. 
305 Ibid:  
• to enhance shareholder engagement and a long-term investment culture; 
•  to ensure better regulation and a ‘Think Small First’ approach; 
•  to make it easier to set up and run a company; and 
•  to provide flexibility for the future. 
306 Attorney- General, the Hon Michael Lavarch, Press Release, ‘New Team for Corporate Law 
Simplification’ 12 August 1993. 
307  Corporations Law Simplification Program , Task Force Plan of Action, December 1993. 
308 Roman Tomasic, ‘The Modernisation of Corporations Law: Corporate Law Reform in Australia 
and Beyond’ (2006) 19 AJCL 2 at 27. 
309   IDF Callinan, ‘The corporate economic reform program: an overview’, Corporations law  Update 
Conference, Sydney Marriott Hotel, 26 October 1998 available at 
http://www.hcourt.gov.au/assets/publications/speeches/former-justices/callinanj/callinanj_calspe.htm, 
accessed 1 January 2013. 
310 Roman Tomasic op cit note 308 at 29.	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focus of reform on modernisation, he said that its ‘aim is to introduce world’s best 
practice in business regulation…and to harmonise Corporations law with pro-
enterprise, pro-jobs and pro-investment objectives.’311 The Company Law Review 
Act 1998 (Commonwealth) was the result of CLERP.    
 The launch of CLERP released a policy framework intended to set the 
direction for corporate reform process.312 The policy paper stated that some of the 
key factors to the reform process were ‘globalisation and market behaviour and the 
law’s failure to keep pace with change’.313 Like the United Kingdom and South 
Africa, Australian company law (both statutory and common law) ‘represents an 
amalgamation of over a century of ideas, theories, and assumptions about the nature 
of corporate activity and its regulation’.314 Over the course of time, as successive 
new ideas have attracted the attention of legislators, judges and regulators, the 
approach followed was to incorporate them to pre-existing doctrines and practices, 
rather than replacing them.315 This process of law reform resulted in the Corporations 
Act 2001 (2001 Act), which has been held to be an inconsistent mixture of principles 
and approaches, most of which have failed to be useful in responding to corporate 
conduct in the early 21st century.316 In support of this view some have plainly stated 
that the 2001 Act, is a ‘complex, ungainly, badly drafted, internally inconsistent, 
conceptually troubled; it is a mishmash of old law, ad hoc amendments, provisions 
pulled willy-nilly from different legal systems, statements which are not law at all, 
ideological posturing, drafting styles that swing wildly from the colloquial to the 
technical…’317         
 Since its inception in 2001, the 2001 Act has been amended a total of 32 
times by different pieces of legislation.318 The Act was influenced in part by a 
number of different sources from different jurisdictions such as, the Canada Business 
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Corporations Act,319 the New Zealand Companies Act,320 the Revised Model 
Business Corporations Act in the United States,321 the efforts of the American Law 
Institute on Corporate Governance,322 the Review of the Hong Kong Companies 
Ordinance323 and, beginning in 1998, the extensive studies of United Kingdom 
companies law undertaken by the Department of Trade.324     
 It has been pointed out that even though there have been amendments to the 
Corporations law the ‘Act is complex and rife with inconsistencies and 
anachronisms’325 whilst others have suggested that the size of the act is welcome as it 
tries to provide possible solutions to common corporate uncertainties without too 
much reliance on the judiciary.326 In time the arguments for and against the 
advantages of the current Act may be cause for a comprehensive review of the 
current Corporations law, with the aim  to clear out outdated provisions and 
modernise company law. This may be done in line with international best practise, 
much like South Africa and the United Kingdom have done with regard to their 
respective Companies Acts. This in time may provide the South African judiciary 
with assistance when faced with a particularly difficult matter. However the 
discussion of future corporate law review in Australia is outside the scope of this 
paper.        
Offers to the public 
One of the policy considerations for corporate legislation in Australia was the need 
for companies to disclose information about their business structure and financial 
positions to the public, in order to provide shareholders and prospective investors 
with adequate information so that they can rationally evaluate prospective 
investments.327   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
319 RSC 1985, c C-44. 
320 1993 (NZ). 
321 2005. 
322 American Law Institute, Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations – 
Volumes 1 & 2 (1994). 
323 Consultancy Report of the Review of the Hong Kong Companies Ordinance (1997).	  
324 Now known as the Department for Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform: see, for example, 
Company Law: Flexibility and Accessibility (2004) 04/994; Company Law Reform: Small Business 
Summary (2005) 05/1780; Company Law Reform Bill: Regulatory Impact Assessment (2005) 
05/2081. 
325 Cally Jordan op cit note 317. 
326 IDF Callinan op cit note 309.	  
327 Roman Tomasic, Stephen Bottomley, Rob McQueen op cit note 314 at 524. 
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Prior to the commencement of the Corporations Act in 1991, it had been held in 
Broken Hill328 that, a ‘prospectus was required when a bidder offered its securities as 
consideration for a bid, provided that the shareholders of the target were properly to 
be regarded as a section of the public’.329 The legal position was that, unless 
securities were offered to the ‘public’ or a ‘section of the public’ no disclosure was 
required.330 The idea was that private offers did not require regulation because the 
offeree had the opportunity to ask the offeror for any relevant information, and the 
cost of preparation of the prospectus could not be justified.331    
 Historically the term ‘offer to the public’ was not defined in-depth.332 As a 
result case law revealed that when determining whether an offer is one made to the 
‘public’ or a ‘section of the public’ one must rely on several factors, as no single 
factor is capable of being determinative of the fact independently.333  The ‘offer to 
the public’ test was later held to be unsatisfactory, in at least two respects: 
i. the test was extraordinarily difficult to apply, and there was considerable 
uncertainty as to when a prospectus would be needed; and  
ii. the test was open to manipulation, particularly because of the exception for 
offers made to persons whose ordinary business was to buy or sell securities. 
For example an inexperienced investor, client of a stockbroker may be 
persuaded to conduct his trading activities through a company formed 
especially for that purpose, and as such the exemption would apply.334 
There were other deficiencies, in the prevailing law, such as ambiguity in the 
circumstances i  which the prospectus would be required for the sale of existing 
shares in a secondary market and the legislation in particular circumstances specified 
the content of the  prospectus in great detail, but did not set up a general disclosure 
standard.335 Additionally, because the prospectus could only be registered when the 
Commission felt that the prospectus complied with the law, the process of examining 
the document was both time consuming and inefficient, it was felt that there were 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
328	  Supra note 66.	  
329 HA J Ford, RP Austin-IM Ramsay  Ford’s Principles of Corporations Law 12 ed (2005) at1124. 
330 HA J Ford, RP Austin-IM Ramsay  Ford’s Principles of Corporations Law 10 ed (2001) at 936. 
331 Ibid. 
332 HA J Ford ,RP Austin, IM Ramsay op cit note 329 at1003. 
333 Ibid; Corporate Affairs Commission v Australian Control Credit Union supra note 39 para 8.	  
334	  HA J Ford, RP Austin-IM Ramsay op cit note 326 at 937. 
335 Ibid. 
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other people better equipped to carry out this process than public officials.336 These 
deficiencies were identified and this led to the enactment of the Corporations Act 
1989, 337this act was in force for a decade without any legal challenges until 1999 
when the constitutionality of the Act was called into question, however, this was 
finally resolved in 2000 and the Commonwealth Parliament passed the Corporations 
Act 2001.338 However a discussion of the constitutionality of corporation law is 
beyond the scope of this paper.       
 The term ‘offer to the public’ is defined in s 82 of the 2001 Act.  It states that 
a group of offerees could be a section of the public even if they were selected as 
clients of the offeror and even if the offer was capable of acceptance only by each 
person to whom it was made. In addition, certain offers are deemed not offers to the 
public or a section of the public, that is an offer made to a person whose ordinary 
business is to buy or sell shares, and an offer made to existing members of the 
corporation.  The term however still remains in the 2001 Act for limited purposes, 
but has lost much of its significance.339 This may be attributable to the fact that on 
closer analysis one notes that s 82 states ‘a reference in this Act to, or to the making 
of, an offer to the public (my own emphasis)’ a term which is distinctly absent from 
ss 706, 707, 708, 708AA and 708A, which state when disclosure to investors is 
required. It would seem that the term ‘offer to the public’ has been replaced by the 
term ‘offer’.         
 The Corporations Law 1991 on inception mirrored a policy decision that a 
prospectus was required when an offer of securities was made to all of the 
shareholders of a company, just as it was required for a rights issue.340 This approach 
has carried over into the 2001 Act, especially where the Act requires disclosure about 
the securities offered in a takeover bid.341      
 Chapter 6D of the 2001 Act regulates the raising of capital from the public. It 
was introduced into the Act by the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program 2 
(Proposals for reform fundraising, treasury, Capital Raising Initiative to Build 
Enterprises and Employment Paper No) and was designed to improve, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
336	  Ibid.	  
337 RP Austin, IM Ramsay op cit note 329 at 1004. 
338	  Julie Cassidy Concise Corporations Law 5ed (2006)  8.	  
339 RP Austin, IM Ramsay op cit note 329 at 1004. 
340	  Ibid.	  
341 S708(18);  RP Austin, IM Ramsay op cit note 329  at 1124. 
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disclosure of material information in an effective way, by  placing 
investors in a position to make more confident assessments about 
securities without undertaking their own costly inquiries. It is 
generally more practicable and cost effective for the fundraiser, rather 
than numerous investors, to undertake inquiries and disclose details 
about its own business.342  
The chapter regulates offers of securities for issue and sale. To determine when an 
offer of securities requires disclosure is contingent upon three concepts, that is ‘offer, 
issue and sale’.343 The concept of ‘offering securities’ for issue or for sale is defined 
to include ‘inviting applications for the issue of the securities and inviting offers to 
purchase securities’.344 The term ‘offer’  for these purposes has, therefore,  been held 
to be wider than its ordinary meaning, it is subsequently, not limited to its ‘technical 
or contractual meaning and may include distributing material that would encourage a 
person to enter into a course of negotiation calculated to result in the issue of 
securities’.345  Subsequently, the meaning is wider because it covers invitations to 
treat, that is expressing a willingness to negotiate.346 The provisions in Chapter 6D 
relating to the disclosure requirement, only apply to public companies that raise 
funds through a process of public offering and not proprietary companies which are 
prohibited in engaging in any activity that requires the registration of a prospectus.347 
 Section 706348 provides that an offer of securities for issue requires disclosure 
unless the offer is exempt under s 708. Notably, the section is concerned with initial 
public offerings; that is, an offer of securities being issued for the first time by the 
company.          
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
342 Tony Ciro, Christopher Symes Corporations Law in Principle 8 ed (2009) 444. 
343	  HA J Ford, RP Austin-IM Ramsay op cit note 330 at 938.	  
344 Corporations Act 2001 s700(2).	  
345	  Attorney-General for NSW v Australian Fixed Trusts Ltd [1974] 1 NSWLR 110.	  
346 Roman Tomasic, Stephen Bottomley, Rob McQueen, op cit note 314 at 532. 
347 Corporations Act 2001 s113 (3) A proprietary company must not engage in any activity that would 
require disclosure to investors under Chapter 6D, except for an offer of its shares to: 
 
                     (a)  existing shareholders of the company; or 
 
                     (b)  employees of the company or of a subsidiary of the company. 
348 Its predecessor used the term ‘subscription’, which applied to allotment and issue of of previously 
unissued securities. Subscription can extend to any allotment for valuable consideration: Governments 
Stocks & Other Securities Investment Co Ltd v Christopher supra . Ashley Black, Tom Bostock, Greg 
Golding, David Healey op cit note 312 at 10. 
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Section 707349 provides for sales offers that need disclosure, it applies to certain sales 
of securities,350 for instance the sale of unlisted shares by a controller of the issuing 
body.351  Section 707(3) contains an anti-avoidance provision that protects investors 
through compliance with the stated requirements when the offer of sale involves, ‘an 
indirect share issue by the company’.352  This section is concerned with secondary 
offers; that is, an offer for the sale of previously issued securities, and the disclosure 
of information is only required in certain circumstances defined in the section.353 A 
prospectus is required for each of these circumstances unless s 708 states otherwise.
 However, the section that is of paramount importance for the purposes of this 
discussion is s 708. It is concerned with certain types of offers that do not require 
disclosure documents. The exemptions are defined and cover primary and secondary 
offers. The exemptions range from the small scale or private offer exemptions354 to 
the professional investor exemption.355 Of particular interest is s 708(18) which 
states, that an offer of securities does not need disclosure to investors if the securities 
are offered as consideration under a takeover bid made under chapter 6 and must, 
therefore, be accompanied by a bidders statement. The subsection further states that, 
although the offer does not need a disclosure document, similar disclosures must be 
made about the securities in the bidder’s statement356 under s 636. Analysing the 
relevant section, that is, s 636 (the bidder’s statement content), and in particular         
s 636(1)(g) which states that ‘if any securities are offered as consideration under the 
bid…all material that would be required for a prospectus for an offer of those 
securities by the bidder under section 710 to 713’ must be included in the bidder’s 
statement. Sections 710 to 713 all refer to the contents of the prospectus. In a nut 
shell, s 636(1)(g), seems to imply that the end result is that the offeror in a takeover 
bid, still has to make similar disclosures found in a disclosure document357 (in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
349 The former Corporations law used the term ‘purchase’ rather than ‘offering of securities’ for sale. 
The term is clearly intended to extend to securities that have been allotted and issued: Re VGN 
Holdings ltd [1942] 1 All ER 224.  Ashley Black, Tom Bostock, Greg Golding, David Healey op cit 
note 312 at 10. 
350	  Corporations Act 2001 s 707(1).	  
351	  Ibid s 707(2).	  
352 Julie Cassidy op cit note 334at 152. 
353 Corporations Act 2001 s707 (2)(3)&(5). 
354 Corporations Act 2001 s708(1). 
355 Corporations Act 2001 s708(11). 
356 Corporations Act 2001  s1 ‘bidder's statement’ means a bidder's statement under sections 636 and 
637 as supplemented. 
357 "disclosure document" for an offer of securities means: 
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particular a prospectus) to the prospective target company, albeit it was exempted in 
s708(18).          
 Chapter 6D makes no reference to the ‘public’ or a ‘section of the public’ as 
is the case in the British and South African companies Act, neither is there any 
reference to the term ‘subscription’. It is important to note that when the Corporate 
Law Economic Reform Program Act 1999, introduced chapter 6D into the 
Corporations Act, it repealed Part 7.12, thereby, removing the requirement that only 
those securities ‘offered to the public’ had to comply with the prospectus 
requirement,358 (see comment on the reduced significance of the term).   
Conclusion 
There is a common theme to company law reform in South Africa, the United 
Kingdom, and Australia.  Company law review, seems to be driven by increased 
globalisation, various changes in market behaviour and the desire to keep abreast 
with change through modernisation of the law. ‘National law makers have come to 
realise that a modernised framework of company law can provide even their closely 
held companies with a competitive advantage’.359     
 Even though the sections in the relevant Australian and South African 
legislations are worded differently, they seem to intimate that an offer that relates to 
a share exchange requires disclosure or a prospectus when made to the public, as 
these Acts only regulate offers made by public companies. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
                     (a)  a prospectus for the offer; or 
 
                     (b)  a profile statement for the offer; or 
 
                     (c)  an offer information statement for the offer. 
358	  Julie Cassidy (footnote) op cit note 334 at 148.	  
359	  RM Unger, Law in Modern Society: Toward a criticism of social theory, 1976, The Free Press, 
London pg 38 refered in Roman Tomasic, ‘The Modernisation of Corporations Law: Corporate Law 
Reform in Australia and Beyond’ (2006) 19 AJCL 2.	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Chapter 4: Companies Act 71 of 2008 
Introduction	  
Public offerings of securities are governed by chapter 4 (ss95 to 111) of the 2008 
Act, the equivalent of ss142 to 169 of the 1973 Act. The objective of the sections is 
to protect members of the public to whom an offer of securities is made by ensuring 
that, ‘amongst other things, there is equality of treatment of offerees and they receive 
all relevant information pertaining to the offer’.360  Having relevant information 
relating to the company is quite useful as it affords the potential investors the chance 
to make a well informed decision.       
 The meaning of ‘offer to the public’ is defined to,   
i. include an offer of securities to be issued by a company to any section 
of the public, whether selected— 
(aa) as holders of that company’s securities; 
(bb) as clients of the person issuing the prospectus; 
(cc) as the holders of any particular class of property; or 
(dd) in any other manner; but 
ii. does not include— 
(aa) an offer made in any of the circumstances contemplated 
in section 96; or 
(bb) a secondary offer effected through an exchange.361 
It therefore follows that if an offer made to the public does not meet the criteria laid 
out in the aforementioned section, then chapter 4 will not apply to the offer, as it is 
not one to the public, and consequently, no prospectus is required.    
Sections 95 (h) and 96 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008  
Offers to the public  
The definition of an ‘offer to the public’ has been defined above. It is strikingly 
similar to that found in the 1973 Act with one notable difference; that is the 
definition contained in the 1973 Act does not include the ‘holders of any particular 
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  Carl Stein; G. K Everingham op cit 219 at 258.	  
361	  Companies Act 71 of 2008 s95(1)(h). 
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class of property or a specific reference to the section specifying offers that do not 
constitute offers to the public in terms of the Act’.362 As highlighted in chapter 1, in 
the past the question of whether an offer is a private or public one, was deemed a 
challenging one, in this area of law, only time will tell if this is still applicable under 
chapter 4 of the 2008 Act. Should an offer constitute an ‘offer to the public’, then it 
must comply with the prescribed prospectus requirements,363 but if it should fall 
within the folds of the exempted categories of offers in section 96, then the 
prospectus requirement falls away. However it is not always so clear cut, there are 
some offers that display features that make it difficult to establish whether it is an 
offer made to the public or to a private group of offerees.364    
 The most recent case to have dealt with the issue of determining the meaning 
of ‘subscription’ was Gold Fields which was discussed in great detail in chapter 2. In 
that case the Supreme Court of Appeal held that the term ‘subscription’ was not 
limited to the taking up of shares for cash, but also included the exchange of 
shares.365  It is believed that s 99, has resolved this issue as the term ‘subscription’ is 
no longer referred in the sections dealing with ‘initial public offerings’, ‘primary 
offers’ or ‘secondary offers’.366 Furthermore, the definitions of the aforementioned 
terms in s 95  do not make reference to the term ‘subscription’, and instead reference 
is made  to ‘an offer of securities’, consequently, the writer sees no need for the 
courts in future to look at this issue in respect of ‘offers to the public’.367  
 Section 95(1)(h) clearly states that an ‘offer to the public’ may be one which 
is made to any section of the public, however selected. Therefore, an offer, even to a 
‘section of the public’, will be deprived of its character as an ‘offer to the public’, for 
the purposes of Chapter 4, if it falls within s 96 (1) (a)–(g).368   
 After the decision in Gold Fields, the position relating to an offer to the 
public for a subscription of securities, was that; a subscription for shares is an 
undertaking to take up shares, not only for cash,369 and that an offer that aimed to 
acquire specific private property was not an offer to the public.370  Following this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
362 Jacqueline Yeats Public offerings of company securities op cit note 28 at 119; s144 of 1973 Act. 
363 Companies Act 71 of 2008 s6(4),(5) & (6), s99. 
364 Jacqueline Yeats Public offerings of company securities op cit note 28 at 119; 
365 Gold Fields v Harmony Gold supra note 77 para 10. 
366 Jacqueline Yeats Public offerings of company securities op cit note 28  at 120; s 99(2) and (3). 
367	  Ibid; 
368 P. A. Delport, Q Vorster ,  Edgar S Henochsberg,op cit note 259 s96.  
369 Gold Fields v Harmony Gold supra note 77  para 9.  
370 Supra note 77  para 16. 
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decision it has been suggested, that s 95(1)(h)(i)(cc), most likely may have been 
inserted to override the judgement in Gold Fields,371 it is also possible that the new 
additions found in s 95(1)(h)(ii), were inserted into the definition of ‘offer to the 
public’ to assist in determining what constitutes an ‘offer to the public’, as Nugent 
JA clearly stated that he thought it would be ‘unhelpful, and potentially misleading, 
to attempt to determine by inference what is included in an ‘offer to the public’ by 
referring to the inclusions and exclusions in ss 142 and 144 respectively…’372  Of 
particular importance is the new definition of the term ‘offer’.373  The Act states that 
‘in relation to securities, an offer made in any way by any person with respect to the 
acquisition, for consideration, of any securities in a company’.  Notably, the 
definition is different to that found in s 142(1) of the 1973 Act. One notes that in the 
new definition there is no mention of the word ‘subscription’, which seems to have 
been replaced by the term ‘acquisition’ and also refers to the term ‘consideration’. 
Consideration has been defined to mean, 
anything of value given and accepted in exchange for any property, 
service, act, omission or forbearance or any other thing of value, 
including; any money, property, negotiable instrument, securities, 
investment credit facility, token or ticket; any labour, barter or similar 
exchange of one thing for another; or any other thing, undertaking, 
promise, agreement or assurance, irrespective of its apparent or 
intrinsic value, or whether it is transferred directly or indirectly.374 
The new definition of ‘offer’ and in particular the definition of ‘consideration’ in the 
2008 Act, help in resolving one of the issues faced by the court in Gold Fields that is 
whether the taking up of shares in exchange for other shares fell within the meaning 
of the term ‘subscription’ in s145 (1973 Act), or is the term confined to taking up 
shares for cash.          
 However, it has been held that the ‘possibility still exists that an offer may 
qualify as an ‘offer to the public’ even though it is made to a limited group of 
persons because it is an offer to a ‘section of the public’ as contemplated by the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
371 Carl Stein; G. K Everingham op cit note 219 at 258.	  
372	  Gold Fields v Harmony Gold supra note 78 para 12. 
373Companies Act 71 of 2008 s95(1)(g). 
374 Ibid s1. 
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definition in s 95(1)(h).’375  This is not to say that the problem has been solved, 
because there may be instances where it is not clear whether a particular offer 
constitutes an offer to the public, or if it falls in the exempted category and whether it 
is a private one, therefore, each case will need to be determined on its merits.376  
Offers that are not offers to public 
Like section 144 of the 1973 Act, section 96 describes offers that are not categorised 
as ‘offers to the public’, and as such do not have to meet the requirements set out in 
section 99 of the 2008 Act. Therefore, any existing case law that relates to the 
interpretation of the section, where the words used are the same in both statutes, 
maybe helpful.377 The rationale behind the exemption of certain, institutions may be 
that these institutions are sophisticated investors, and as such have the requisite 
knowledge and are in a favourable position to acquire the relevant company 
information to assist in making a well-informed investment decision, thus rendering 
a prospectus superfluous.378        
 There are two new exemption categories that were added to the 2008 Act that 
were not found in the 1973 Act, namely that when an offer is made to persons whose 
ordinary business, or part of whose ordinary business, is to deal in securities, whether 
as principals or agents and offers made to the Public Investment Corporation, they 
are not to be considered as offers to the public.379 It has been suggested that this may 
possibly have been done to overcome ‘the requirement for a prospectus where 
approaches are being made to brokers or investment firms to assess potential demand 
as part of a process of ‘book-building’ prior to making a public offer’.380  
Gold Fields v Harmony Gold under the 2008 Act  
As previously mentioned the South Africa company law has its foundations in 
English company law principles. The trend of finding assistance in other jurisdictions 
was continued in the South African company law reform process, as it was in line 
with one of the DTI’s objectives of modernising company law in line with 
international best practice. It follows that some members of the law reform team 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
375 Jacqueline Yeats Public offerings of company securities op cit note 28  at 121. 
376 Ibid.	  
377	  Jacqueline Yeats ‘Public Offerings of Company Securities’ in Farouk HI Cassim et al (eds) 
Contemporary Company Law 2 ed (2012) at 656. 
378 Companies Act 71 of 2008 s96(1)(a); P. A. Delport, Q Vorster ,  Edgar S Henochsberg  op cit note 
259. 
379 Companies Act 71 of 2008 s96(1)(a)(i)(ii). 
380 Jacqueline Yeats Public offerings of company securities op cit note 28 at 122. 
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included international reference teams381 that specialised in the priority areas 
identified for consideration,382 were drawn from South Africa’s major trading and 
investment partners, as well as commonwealth jurisdiction, which share similar law 
traditions.383  As such when applying the law to the facts of Gold Fields, regard may 
be had to s 4(2) with respect to the use of case law from other jurisdictions in an 
effort to interpret and apply the law.       
 The court in Gold Fields may have been persuaded by the approach followed 
by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York in Gold 
Fields Limited v Harmony Gold Mining Company Limited.384 In that case, Gold 
Fields sought a preliminary injunction to prevent Harmony from continuing its two-
phase tender offer to United States (US) investors in shares of Gold Fields. The court 
denied the motion for a preliminary junction, because Gold Fields failed to establish 
irreparable harm for several reasons, including the fact that Gold Fields waited two 
weeks after Harmony filed its prospectus and registration statement before filing this 
suit. Gold Field’s claim was based on section 14(d)(1) of the Williams Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1), which provides, in relevant part: 
It shall be unlawful for any person . . . to make a tender offer for . . . 
any class of any equity security . . . unless . . . such person has filed 
with the Commission a statement containing such of the information 
specified in section 78m(d) of this title, and such additional 
information as the Commission may by rules and regulations prescribe 
as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection 
of investors. 
The rationale behind the Williams Act is founded on the principle that full and fair 
disclosure of all material facts must be made in connection with all tender offers 
(include a share exchange) so that investors may have benefit of all significant facts 
in making their investment decisions.385 Furthermore, the sole purpose of the 
Williams Act under 15 USCS § 78n(d), is to protect investors who are confronted 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
381 Included corporate law expects from Australia, United States of America and the United Kingdom:  
Tshepo Mongalo op cit note 238 at xvi. 
382Ibid namely, (1) corporate formation; (2) corporate finance; (3) corporate governance; (4) business 
rescue and mergers and takeovers; (5) not-for profit companies; and (6) administration and 
enforcement. 
383 Tshepo Mongalo op cit note 238 at  xvii. 
384 Limited 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23874. 
385 Missouri Portland Cement Co. v H. K. Porter Co. (1976, CA8 Mo) 535 F2d 388. 
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with a tender offer, to have adequate information concerning qualifications and 
intentions of offering party.386  Even though the provisions are worded differently, 
the aim of the Williams Act and the 2008 Act is to protect investors; this alone 
should have persuasive force, that would afford the South African judiciary with 
some guidelines on how to treat the issue of ‘offers to the public’.   
 Like the 1973 Act, Chapter 4 of the 2008 Act has the objective to protect the 
investor by prohibiting ‘offers to the public’, unless they comply with the 
requirements set in the provisions, in ‘relation to full and truthful disclosure’.387 
Consequently, the definition of ‘offer to the public’ still remains relevant under the 
2008 Act in establishing whether or not an offer has been made to the public and as 
such if the provisions requiring the issuing of a prospectus are triggered.388  
Presumably, if Gold Fields were to be brought before the court under the 2008 Act, it 
would still be relevant to look at the Corporate Affairs Commission389 case to try and 
determine whether the offer was one to the ‘public’ or a ‘section of the public’. One 
of the criticisms of the decision in Gold Fields by the Supreme Court of Appeal was 
the fact that it failed to apply the whole test as expounded in Corporate Affairs 
Commission as any single factor alone was not conclusive of the offer being one 
made to a ‘section of the public’.390       
 The approach by the court in establishing the rational connection arm of the 
test391 was merely cursory and as a result failed to consider the second arm of the 
test, which is the analysis of the variety of factors listed in the Corporate Affairs 
Commission case. These factors consist of: the number of persons in the group; the 
subsisting relationship between the offeror and the members of the group; the nature 
and content of the offer; the significance of any particular characteristic which 
identifies the members of the group; and any connection between that characteristic 
and the offer.392         
 When considering the other factors left out by the court, with regard to the 
facts in Gold Fields, the result is that there was no special relationship between the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
386 E. H. I. of Florida, Inc. v Insurance Co. of North America (1980, ED Pa) 499 F Supp 1053, CCH 
Fed Secur L Rep P 97686, affd (1981, CA3 Pa) 652 F2d 310, CCH Fed Secur L Rep P 98019. 
387 Gretchen De Smit & Christian Ntuta ‘A practical guide to the implications of the new Companies 
Act – public offers’  (2010) De Rebus 47. 
388 Ibid. 
389 Supra note 39 para 8. 
390 Maleka Femida Cassim op cit note 84 at 270 at 277. 
391 Gold Fields v Harmony Gold supra note 77 para 14. 
392 Corporate Affairs Commission supra note 39 para 8.	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offeror (Harmony) and the offerees (Gold Fields), Harmony was a stranger to Gold 
Fields. The sheer size of the members of Gold Fields on its own is also indicative of 
an assumption that the offer was made to the public, albeit a large ‘section of the 
public’. Furthermore, the common characteristics of the group were neither 
restrictive nor well defined as there was no certainty as to the identity of the offerees, 
at the time of the offer.393 Lastly, there was no subsisting relationship between 
Harmony and Gold Fields, as such the offer made by Harmony to the shareholders of 
Gold Fields was an ‘offer to the public’ and accordingly, should comply with the 
prospectus requirements set in s 99 of the 2008 Act.     
 The distinction between a primary offering394 and a secondary offering,395 
illustrated  by the 2008 Act helps in providing a new approach to looking at the Gold 
Fields issue of whether a share exchange in order to achieve a merger would 
constitute ‘an offer to the public’ as defined in s 95(h) of the 2008 Act. As regards 
offering shares pursuant to a primary offering  a distinction is drawn between listed 
and unlisted shares,396 all offers of listed shares must comply with the requirements 
of the relevant stock exchange where shares are listed.397 It is important to note that 
both companies in Gold Fields were listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange 
(JSE), inevitably, the actions of Harmony with respect to offers to members of Gold 
Fields will be regulated by the JSE, and as such, must comply with the JSE 
requirements for a listed company as stipulated in s 99(3)(a)(i). These JSE 
requirements generally require disclosure to the public.    
 It was held in Gold Fields, that an offer is not made to the public when the 
‘offer aims to acquire specific private property’,398 however s 95 (1) (h) (i) (cc), 
provides a definition that an offer to the public includes an offer of a company’s 
securities to any section of the public whether selected as, inter alia, the holders of 
any particular class of property or in any other manner.  This means that Gold Fields 
shareholders would constitute a ‘section of the public’, and as such the offer by 
Harmony must comply with the requirements of s 99 and provide a prospectus. 
Consequently, a gold-fields type offer will qualify to be an ‘offer to the public’.399 
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  Maleka Femida Cassim op cit note 84 at 279. 
394 Companies Act 71 of 2008 s 95(1)(i). 
395 Ibid s 95 (1)(m). 
396 Ibid s 99(3). 
397 Ibid s99(3)(a)(i). 
398 Gold Fields v Harmony Gold supra note 77 para 15-14. 
399 Jacqueline Yeats Public offerings of company securities op cit note 28 at 121. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
60	  
	  
	  
	  
Section 7 in conjunction with s 158 affords the courts the power to ‘promote the 
spirit, purpose and objects of the Act,’400 in furtherance of this objective the court 
must develop the common law when it is necessary to improve the realisation of 
rights in terms of the Act.401 Therefore the court in Gold Fields had the power to 
develop common law should the Companies Act fail in promoting the development 
of the South African economy by encouraging transparency, and investments in 
South African markets. Consequently, the court had the power to determine that the 
Harmony offer was an ‘offer to the public’ and as such required a prospectus. 
 Section 95(1)(g) defines the term ‘offer’, it has been suggested that this 
meaning now includes the notion of barter, that was previously mentioned in chapter 
2. 402 Consequently, this would also mean that a share exchange was a ‘subscription’ 
and as such requires a prospectus be provided to potential investors. 
Conclusion  
The Supreme Court of Appeal in Gold Fields established that a ‘subscription’ 
included a share exchange, and that an offer to a certain group selected specifically 
because of their ownership of ‘private property’ did not constitute an offer to a 
‘section of the public’. Implicitly the approach followed by the court failed to 
implement one of the principal aims of the 1973 Act that is to provide the potential 
investor with statutory protection.        
 It has been held that modernising company law is a never ending process;403 
but, legal systems that have managed to keep abreast of the changing times and 
adapted legislation in response to the constantly changing environment have proved 
to be more successful.404 A lot of legislated changes have occurred to the South 
African company law, including the law relating to ‘offers to the public’. The 
Companies Act 71 of 2008, has nullified the effects of the decision in Gold Fields. 
The term ‘subscription’ has been jettisoned from the provisions relating to an ‘offer 
to the public’, and has instead been replaced by the term ‘acquisition’ (however this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
400 P. A. Delport, Q Vorster ,  Edgar S Henochsberg  op cit note 259 s7.	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  Companies Act 71 of 2008 s158(a).	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  Piet Delport The New Companies Act Manual (2009) 25.	  
403 B de Sousa, ‘The Postmodern Transition: Law and Politics in A Sarat and TR Kearns (EDs), The 
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term has not been defined by the Act, for the purposes of an offer). Additionally 
within the definition of ‘offer’ the term ‘consideration’ has been included, it has a 
wide meaning that encompasses ‘securities’ (including shares) which can be given 
and accepted in exchange for any property.      
 Under the 2008 Act the term ‘offer to the public’ includes ‘the holders of any 
particular class of property’ and within the same provision it references the different 
categories of offers that are not to be considered as ‘offers to the public’. The 
reference to the offers that are not ‘offers to the public’ is there to assist in 
determining what constitutes an ‘offer to the public’.     
 Accordingly, the legislature  with respect to the concept of an ‘offer to the 
public’ has tried to provide clarity and certainty in this area of the law, however only 
time will tell whether this has been achieved, when matters relating to ‘offers to the 
public’ are brought before the court. As it stands, a gold fields type offer is an offer 
to the public under the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
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